On 20 April 2026, Philippine media reported that the National Bureau of Investigation had arrested 48 individuals after raiding an alleged online scamming hub in Parañaque City. The timing matters. This is not an old case being revisited. It is a fresh reminder that scam operations across Southeast Asia are still active, organised, and scaling fast.

When authorities entered the site, they did not just uncover another isolated scam. They walked into something far more structured — an operation that looked less like opportunistic fraud and more like a production line.

Dozens of individuals. Multiple devices. Coordinated activity. A setup that resembled a call centre more than a loose group of fraudsters.

For compliance teams, this is not just another headline. It is a signal. Modern scam networks are becoming more industrialised, and the financial trails they leave behind are becoming harder to detect with static, siloed controls.

What Actually Happened in Parañaque

The raid exposed an online scamming hub operating at scale. Investigators found individuals actively engaged in defrauding victims, likely through a mix of social engineering tactics — investment scams, impersonation schemes, and possibly romance or job scams.

What stood out was not just the activity itself, but the structure:

• Multiple operators working simultaneously
• Dedicated systems and devices
• Coordinated workflows
• A controlled environment, almost like a call centre

This was not a loose group of fraudsters. It was organised, repeatable, and designed for volume.

That distinction matters.

Because once fraud becomes structured like this, it stops being unpredictable and starts becoming scalable.

The Shift from Scams to Scam Infrastructure

For years, fraud has often been viewed as a series of isolated incidents. A phishing email here. A social engineering case there.

That lens no longer holds.

What the Parañaque case reveals is something deeper: the rise of scam infrastructure.

These are not individuals improvising. These are networks designed with:

• Recruitment pipelines
• Scripted engagement models
• Operational roles and hierarchies
• Performance-driven execution

In many ways, these setups mirror legitimate businesses — except the product being “sold” is deception.

And like any efficient system, they optimise over time.

They test what works. They refine messaging. They reuse successful playbooks. They scale quickly.

For financial institutions, this changes the challenge entirely.

You are no longer detecting one-off fraud. You are up against systems that are constantly learning and adapting.

Why This Matters for Financial Institutions

At first glance, a physical raid in the Philippines may feel distant to a bank in Singapore or a fintech in Australia.

But the financial footprint of such operations is rarely local.

Scam proceeds move quickly — often across borders, across institutions, and across channels.

A typical flow might look like this:

• Victim transfers funds via online banking or wallet
• Funds are routed through mule accounts
• Split into smaller transactions
• Moved across jurisdictions
• Layered further to obscure origin

By the time the money surfaces in a financial institution’s system, it often appears routine.

That is the real risk.

Not at the point of the scam, but at the point where illicit funds blend into legitimate financial flows.

The Hidden Complexity Behind “Simple” Scams

It is easy to dismiss scams as basic manipulation.

But cases like this show how layered they have become.

Behind a single victim interaction, there may be:

• A recruitment network sourcing operators
• A technical setup managing communication channels
• A financial layer handling fund movement
• A supervisory layer coordinating activity

Each layer introduces its own signals.

But those signals are rarely obvious in isolation.

A transaction might look normal.
A customer profile might appear clean.
A payment pattern may not trigger any threshold.

Yet, when viewed together, they form a pattern.

This is the daily reality for compliance teams — connecting weak, fragmented signals into something meaningful.

Where Traditional Detection Starts to Break Down

Most financial institutions still rely, at least in part, on rule-based monitoring.

And rules do have their place.

But against structured scam operations, they begin to show limitations:

• Static thresholds struggle against evolving behaviour
• Isolated alerts fail to capture network patterns
• Manual tuning cannot keep pace with changing typologies

In the Parañaque case, individual transactions may not have appeared suspicious.

What made them risky was the context — the coordination, the repetition, the connections.

This is where traditional systems fall short.

They are built to detect anomalies, not ecosystems.

The Role of Mule Networks in Scaling Fraud

No large-scale scam operation works without one critical component: money mules.

These accounts absorb, move, and disguise illicit funds.

And they are becoming increasingly sophisticated.

Some are unwitting — recruited through job offers or incentives.
Others are complicit — knowingly participating in exchange for a share.

Either way, they create a buffer between fraudsters and the financial system.

In operations like the Parañaque hub, mule networks likely operate in parallel:

• Receiving funds from multiple victims
• Redistributing across accounts
• Moving funds rapidly across borders

From a compliance perspective, mule activity often appears as:

• High-velocity transactions
• Rapid inflows and outflows
• Accounts with little genuine economic activity

But again, these signals are rarely conclusive on their own.

The Cross-Border Reality

Modern fraud rarely stays within one jurisdiction.

A scam initiated in one country can impact victims in another, with funds routed through multiple regions.

This creates three persistent challenges:

1. Fragmented visibility
   No single institution sees the full transaction chain
2. Jurisdictional differences
   Regulatory expectations and data access vary
3. Delayed intervention
   By the time alerts are triggered, funds have already moved

The Parañaque case reinforces a simple truth: financial crime is global, even when it appears local.

What Compliance Teams Should Be Looking For

Rather than focusing on isolated red flags, institutions need to identify patterns of behaviour.

Indicators aligned with operations like this include:

• Clusters of accounts exhibiting similar transaction flows
• Repeated low-to-mid value transfers across multiple beneficiaries
• Rapid movement of funds with minimal retention
• Shared identifiers such as devices, IPs, or contact details
• Activity inconsistent with stated customer profiles

Individually, these may not trigger concern.

Collectively, they signal coordination.

Moving from Detection to Understanding

There is a broader shift underway in financial crime prevention.

From generating alerts…
To understanding behaviour.

It is no longer enough to flag transactions.

Teams need to ask:

• Why is this activity happening?
• How is it connected to other behaviour?
• What broader typology does it resemble?

This shift is not easy.

Because understanding requires context — and context requires intelligence beyond internal data.

The Role of Collaborative Intelligence

Cases like the Parañaque scam hub highlight a structural gap.

No single institution has full visibility.

Fraud patterns are distributed across:

• Banks
• Fintech platforms
• Payment processors
• Geographies

Which means detection cannot rely on isolated systems.

Collaborative intelligence becomes critical.

By sharing typologies, behavioural patterns, and risk signals without exposing sensitive data institutions can:

• Detect emerging threats earlier
• Improve accuracy
• Reduce false positives

This is where community-driven intelligence models are gaining traction.

Where Technology Needs to Evolve

To keep pace with structured fraud operations, detection systems need to evolve in three ways:

1. From rules to adaptive intelligence
Systems must continuously learn from emerging patterns

2. From transactions to networks
Detection must capture relationships, not just events

3. From alerts to actionable insights
Outputs must support faster, clearer investigation decisions

This is not about replacing existing systems overnight.

It is about enhancing them to reflect how fraud actually operates today.

The Cost of Getting This Wrong

The impact of missing these signals goes beyond financial loss.

There are broader consequences:

• Increased regulatory scrutiny
• Reputational damage
• Erosion of customer trust

In fast-growing digital markets, trust is not easily rebuilt once lost.

And fraud, left unchecked, directly undermines it.

A More Grounded Way Forward

The Parañaque case is not an anomaly. It is part of a pattern.

Fraud is becoming:

• More organised
• More scalable
• More adaptive

And increasingly embedded within legitimate financial systems.

Responding to this requires a shift:

From reactive to proactive
From siloed to collaborative
From static to adaptive

For compliance teams, this is not about chasing every new scam.

It is about building the capability to recognise patterns — even as they evolve.

Conclusion: Beyond the Raid

The arrest of 48 individuals is a meaningful enforcement action.

But it is not the end of the story.

Operations like these rarely disappear. They adapt, relocate, and re-emerge.

For financial institutions, the real question is not whether such scams exist.

It is whether their systems can detect the financial signals these operations inevitably leave behind.

Because while enforcement can shut down a physical hub, the financial trails continue to move.

And that is where the real battle is being fought.

Picture a compliance officer at a Malaysian licensed bank three weeks out from a BNM AML/CFT examination. She has read AMLATFPUAA. She knows the Act was amended in 2014 and again in 2020. What she needs now is not another legislative summary. She needs to know what BNM's examiners will actually open on their laptops when they arrive — which files, which logs, which policy documents — and where programmes at institutions like hers most commonly fall short.

That is what this guide covers.

The legislative history of AMLATFPUAA and its impact on Malaysia's financial sector is covered in our [overview of AMLA and its impact on the Malaysian financial landscape](/compliance-hub/understanding-amla-impact-on-malaysia-financial-landscape). This article focuses on the operational layer: the ongoing compliance obligations that BNM-supervised institutions must meet, the specific thresholds and timelines that govern reporting, and the recurring examination gaps that BNM has identified in practice.

The Regulatory Framework in Brief

Two instruments govern AML/CFT compliance for BNM-supervised institutions in Malaysia.

AMLATFPUAA 2001 is the primary legislation. The 2014 amendment expanded the list of predicate offences and brought Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) into the compliance perimeter. The 2020 amendment strengthened beneficial ownership requirements and raised maximum penalties to MYR 3 million per offence, or 5 years imprisonment, or both. For financial institutions, the penalties can run per transaction or per day of non-compliance — which changes the risk calculus considerably.

BNM's AML/CFT and TF Policy Document (2023) is where the day-to-day compliance standards sit. The Policy Document translates AMLATFPUAA's obligations into specific programme requirements: who must be screened, how, at what intervals, and with what documentation. BNM's Financial Intelligence and Enforcement Department (FIED) is the enforcement arm that reviews STR filings and leads enforcement action.

When a BNM examiner cites a deficiency, the reference is almost always to the Policy Document, not to the Act itself. Knowing the Act is necessary; knowing the Policy Document is what keeps a programme compliant.

Who Must Comply: Reporting Institutions Under AMLATFPUAA

AMLATFPUAA defines "Reporting Institutions" across three categories, each carrying distinct obligations.

Category 1 covers licensed banks, Islamic banks, and development financial institutions. These institutions carry the fullest set of AML/CFT obligations under the Policy Document, including mandatory enterprise-wide risk assessments and comprehensive transaction monitoring programmes.

Category 2 covers money service businesses (MSBs), remittance operators, and e-money issuers. The obligations are materially equivalent to Category 1 for CDD and reporting, but the Policy Document recognises that the risk typologies differ — particularly for remittance operators processing high-frequency, lower-value cross-border transfers.

Category 3 covers DNFBPs: lawyers, accountants, and real estate agents, brought in under the 2014 amendment. DNFBP obligations are threshold-triggered — they apply when a transaction reaches a defined cash value or when the DNFBP is facilitating a category of activity specified in the Act.

The DNFBP category matters for banks because banks deal with these professionals as customers. When a law firm holds a client account at your institution, BNM expects you to recognise that relationship as carrying elevated risk — and to apply the CDD standards appropriate to it.

Customer Due Diligence: Three Tiers, Different Standards

BNM's AML/CFT Policy Document sets three CDD tiers. Which tier applies depends on the risk profile of the customer and the nature of the business relationship — not on an institution's convenience.

Standard CDD

Standard CDD applies to all new customers unless simplified CDD conditions are met. It requires identification and verification of the customer, documentation of the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship, and a customer risk assessment at onboarding. Verification must be based on independent and reliable sources — a customer self-certifying their identity is not sufficient.

For individual customers, verification typically involves government-issued identification. For corporate customers, it extends to directors, authorised signatories, and ultimate beneficial owners (UBOs).

Simplified CDD

Simplified CDD is available for customers assessed as low-risk: listed companies on a regulated exchange, government entities, and FIs supervised by BNM or an equivalent foreign regulator. Under simplified CDD, identification is still required but the depth of verification can be reduced, and ongoing monitoring can operate at lower intensity.

The Policy Document is explicit that simplified CDD is a risk-based determination — not a category exemption. An institution cannot apply simplified CDD to a listed company without first concluding that the specific company and the specific transaction type present low money laundering risk.

Enhanced Due Diligence

Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) is mandatory for four customer categories:

• Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) — domestic and foreign
• Customers from FATF-identified jurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies
• Corporate customers with complex or non-transparent ownership structures
• Customers engaged in cash-intensive businesses

EDD requirements under the Policy Document are specific. For PEPs, the institution must verify source of funds and source of wealth — not just identify the customer's occupation. Senior management approval is required before establishing or continuing a relationship with a PEP. The approval must be documented, with a named approver. Periodic review of PEP relationships is mandatory at least every 2 years.

For all EDD customers, monitoring intensity must be increased. What "increased" means in practice is calibrated monitoring rules, not a generic note in the file that the customer is high-risk.

Beneficial ownership threshold: BNM sets the threshold for identifying UBOs at 25% ownership or control — consistent with the FATF standard. Institutions must trace ownership to natural persons. Nominee structures, trusts, and multi-layer corporate arrangements are not a legitimate stopping point. If your CDD file shows a holding company as the UBO rather than the individuals who own it, the file is incomplete.

For institutions operating digital onboarding channels, the BNM eKYC Policy Document sets out the technical requirements that must be met for remote CDD to carry the same assurance as face-to-face verification. The specifics for digital banks and e-money issuers are covered in our eKYC Malaysia guide.

Ongoing Monitoring Requirements

Onboarding CDD is not a one-time event. BNM's Policy Document requires institutions to monitor the business relationship throughout its duration — which means monitoring transactions for consistency with the customer's risk profile, stated purpose, and expected transaction patterns.

When Re-KYC Is Required

The Policy Document specifies triggers that require re-assessment of a customer's KYC data:

• A material change in the customer's circumstances (change in business activity, change in ownership structure, change in country of domicile)
• A change in the customer's risk rating — either triggered by a system alert or a periodic review
• Reactivation of a dormant account (inactive for 12 months or more)
• Scheduled periodic review for high-risk customers — at minimum every 2 years

The 12-month dormancy trigger and the 2-year PEP review cycle are not recommendations. They are requirements. BNM examiners check whether these cycles are documented and whether the reviews are substantive — not whether a checkbox was ticked.

Transaction Monitoring Calibration

BNM's examination findings have repeatedly cited one gap above others: institutions running transaction monitoring with default threshold settings that have not been calibrated to the institution's own customer risk profile.

Default thresholds — those that come with a monitoring system out of the box — are designed to be functional across a broad range of institutions. They are not designed to reflect the specific risk profile of your customer book. A licensed bank whose retail clients are primarily salaried employees in Klang Valley has a different expected transaction pattern than an MSB processing remittances to Southeast Asian labour markets. Their monitoring should look different.

BNM expects institutions to document why their thresholds are set where they are, when they were last reviewed, and who approved the current calibration. If the answer is "these are the system defaults," that is a finding waiting to be written.

To understand what an effective transaction monitoring programme should look like — and what to evaluate when selecting or upgrading a system — see our Transaction Monitoring Software Buyer's Guide and What Is Transaction Monitoring.

Reporting Obligations: Timelines and Thresholds

BNM-supervised institutions have two primary reporting obligations to FIED. Both have defined timelines that examination teams check.

Cash Threshold Reports (CTRs)

Any cash transaction — or series of related cash transactions — of MYR 25,000 or above must be reported to FIED via the goAML system (Malaysia adopted the UNODC goAML platform in 2020). The filing deadline is 3 business days from the date of the transaction.

CTR filing is largely mechanical for institutions with core banking systems capable of automated flagging. Where BNM has found gaps is in the manual detection of structured transactions — multiple sub-MYR 25,000 cash deposits by the same customer within a short period, designed to stay below the CTR threshold. Structuring is a predicate offence under AMLATFPUAA. Failing to detect it is a monitoring failure, not just a reporting failure.

Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs)

An STR must be filed when a staff member or system alert produces grounds to suspect that a transaction involves the proceeds of a scheduled offence or is connected to terrorist financing. The deadline is 3 working days from the point at which suspicion is formed — not from when the transaction occurred.

That distinction matters. If a transaction alerts in your monitoring system on Monday and a compliance analyst forms a reasonable suspicion on Wednesday, the STR clock started on Wednesday, not Monday.

BNM examination findings have identified a specific quality gap in STR filings: reports submitted without an adequate documented basis for suspicion. An STR that records "transaction appeared unusual" without specifying what pattern triggered the suspicion, what investigation was conducted, and why the analyst concluded suspicion was warranted, does not meet the standard. The goAML system requires structured data fields to be completed — but the narrative quality of what goes into those fields is what BNM examiners assess.

The internal pathway matters too. Institutions must have a documented process for staff to escalate concerns to the MLRO via an Internal Suspicious Transaction Report (ISTR). Frontline staff who identify red flags and have no clear escalation route — or who fear that escalating will reflect poorly on them — are a systemic gap. BNM expects staff training to address this directly.

AML/CFT Programme Governance

A compliant AML/CFT programme is not a set of policies in a folder. BNM's Policy Document specifies the governance structure that must be in place.

Board-approved compliance programme. The institution's AML/CFT programme must be documented, formally approved by the Board of Directors, and reviewed at minimum annually. A programme that exists only in the compliance officer's head — or that was last updated before the 2020 AMLATFPUAA amendments — is non-compliant.

Designated Compliance Officer (DCO). The DCO must sit at senior management level and must have direct access to the Board or Board Audit Committee when escalation is required. BNM examiners specifically check whether the DCO has the seniority and independence to escalate concerns without internal obstruction. An institution where the MLRO reports upward through the business line whose clients they are monitoring has a structural governance problem.

Independent AML/CFT audit. The audit function — whether internal or conducted by a qualified external party — must assess the AML/CFT programme at least once per year. The scope must cover policy adequacy, operational effectiveness, and staff training outcomes. An audit that confirms the policies exist but does not test whether they work is not what BNM requires.

Staff training. Training must be documented, with records of attendance and assessment results. BNM examiners have cited institutions where training records were incomplete or where training had not been updated to reflect regulatory changes — including the goAML transition and the 2020 AMLATFPUAA amendments.

Common BNM Examination Gaps

Based on publicly available BNM guidance and supervisory feedback, five gaps recur across examinations of Malaysian institutions.

Outdated customer risk assessments. Customers onboarded years ago under different risk criteria and never re-assessed — even when their transaction patterns have materially changed.

Incomplete beneficial ownership documentation for corporate customers. Files that identify a corporate structure but stop at the holding company level, without tracing to the natural persons who ultimately control it.

STRs filed without documented analytical basis. The filing exists, but the rationale is absent. This satisfies neither the spirit nor the operational requirement of the obligation.

Default monitoring thresholds. System thresholds not calibrated to the institution's specific customer risk profile — and no documentation that the calibration question was ever asked.

Inadequate scrutiny of DNFBPs as customers. Banks treating law firm client accounts or real estate agent trust accounts the same as ordinary business accounts, without recognising the elevated risk profile those relationships carry under AMLATFPUAA.

Malaysia's FATF Context: Why Examination Intensity Has Increased

Malaysia's FATF Mutual Evaluation in 2023 assessed both technical compliance and effectiveness — two different standards. Technical compliance measures whether the laws and regulations are in place. Effectiveness measures whether they work.

Malaysia's technical compliance ratings were largely Compliant or Largely Compliant. Its effectiveness ratings were lower — particularly for the transparency of corporate beneficial ownership, where the evaluation found that beneficial ownership information was not always available to competent authorities in a timely way.

For BNM-supervised institutions, the practical effect is this: BNM is under pressure to demonstrate that AML controls are operationally effective, not just formally present. Examination intensity has increased since 2023. The scrutiny on beneficial ownership documentation, on monitoring calibration, and on STR quality is not coincidental. These are the areas the FATF evaluation identified as weakest, and they are the areas BNM examiners are examining most carefully.

Preparing for What Examiners Actually Review

The compliance officer three weeks out from her BNM examination should be checking seven things:

1. Are customer risk assessments current — specifically for dormant accounts and for customers whose transaction patterns have changed?
2. Do all corporate customer files trace beneficial ownership to natural persons at the 25% threshold?
3. Are monitoring thresholds documented with a calibration rationale — and reviewed within the last 12 months?
4. Do STR files contain a structured basis for suspicion, not just a transaction reference?
5. Is the DCO's seniority and Board access documented?
6. Was the AML/CFT audit conducted in the past year, and did its scope include operational testing?
7. Are staff training records complete and current for all frontline and compliance staff?

These are not abstract compliance questions. They are the specific items that BNM examinations have produced findings on. Getting them right before the examination is considerably easier than explaining gaps during it.

If you want to see how Tookitaki's platform supports CDD, transaction monitoring calibration, and STR quality management for BNM-supervised institutions, book a demo. Or download our Malaysia AML compliance checklist for a full pre-examination review framework tailored to AMLATFPUAA and the BNM AML/CFT Policy Document. For institutions evaluating or upgrading their monitoring systems, the Transaction Monitoring Software Buyer's Guide covers what to look for and what to ask vendors about calibration and alert management. If you're new to the foundations of KYC and CDD, our What Is KYC guide provides the conceptual grounding the Policy Document assumes you have.

The MAS approval letter arrives. The Major Payment Institution licence is granted. The founders celebrate. The press release goes out.

Then the compliance team sits down.

The PSA licence covers seven categories of payment service activity, and the AML/CFT obligations attached to each are substantive. Unlike MAS Notice 626 for banks, which has years of published guidance, examination findings, and industry interpretation built around it, the PSA AML framework is less documented. The notices exist. The obligations are real. But the compliance team at a newly licensed MPI often has to build from scratch, without the institutional knowledge that banks have accumulated since 2002.

This guide covers what the Payment Services Act requires from licensed payment institutions in Singapore, specifically on AML/CFT. It is written for compliance officers, MLROs, and legal teams at standard payment institutions (SPIs) and major payment institutions (MPIs) who know what the PSA is but need to understand their specific obligations in detail.

The PSA Framework: Scope and Licence Tiers

The Payment Services Act 2019 (PSA) came into force on 28 January 2020 and was substantially amended by the Payment Services (Amendment) Act 2021 (PS(A)A 2021), which extended regulatory coverage to previously unregulated services and introduced stricter obligations for digital payment token providers.

The PSA regulates seven categories of payment service:

1. Account issuance services
2. Domestic money transfer services
3. Cross-border money transfer services
4. Merchant acquisition services
5. E-money issuance services
6. Digital payment token (DPT) services
7. Money-changing services

A firm does not need to offer all seven to be licensed. Many MPIs hold licences for two or three categories — a cross-border remittance operator with an e-money issuance component is common. Each service category the firm is licensed for carries AML/CFT obligations independently.

Two Licence Tiers, Different AML Exposure

The PSA creates two licence tiers that determine the depth of AML obligations.

Standard Payment Institutions (SPIs) are subject to monthly transaction thresholds: SGD 3 million per month across all regulated services, or SGD 1.5 million per month for any single regulated service. At these volumes, SPIs can apply simplified CDD in some circumstances and face lighter ongoing monitoring requirements.

Major Payment Institutions (MPIs) exceed those thresholds. MPIs face the full suite of AML/CFT obligations under MAS Notice PSN01 (or PSN02 for DPT services). MAS expects MPI-level controls to be equivalent in standard to those at licensed banks — the fact that a firm is a payment institution rather than a bank does not reduce the expectation.

One important clarification on scope: the PSA exempts certain intra-group transfers and specific corporate treasury services from its regulated activities. Whether a firm's particular activity falls within an exemption requires analysis of the specific transaction flows — MAS has not published a comprehensive list, and several firms have sought clarification through the licensing process itself.

MAS Notice PSN01: The Core AML Obligations

MAS Notice PSN01 — "Prevention of Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism — Holders of a Standard Payment Institution Licence or a Major Payment Institution Licence (Non-DPT Services)" — was issued under section 103 of the PSA and took effect when the Act commenced in January 2020.

PSN01 applies to payment institutions providing any of the seven regulated services except DPT services (which fall under PSN02, covered below). Its structure mirrors MAS Notice 626 for banks, adapted for the payment context.

The four core obligation areas under PSN01 are:

1. Customer Due Diligence (CDD)

Payment institutions must identify and verify customers, understand the nature and purpose of the business relationship, and conduct ongoing monitoring. The CDD threshold for occasional transactions is SGD 1,500 — lower than the SGD 5,000 threshold that applies to banks under Notice 626. This difference reflects the higher anonymity risk in payment services, where customer relationships are typically shorter and account history shallower than in traditional banking.

Enhanced due diligence (EDD) is required for:

• Any transaction above SGD 5,000
• Cross-border transfers to or from jurisdictions on the FATF grey or black list
• Customers who present higher-risk indicators under the institution's risk assessment

Simplified CDD is available only for SPI-tier products with capped e-money balances — the maximum cap for simplified CDD to apply is SGD 5,000 in stored value.

2. Ongoing Monitoring

PSN01 requires payment institutions to monitor transactions for unusual or suspicious patterns. The monitoring standard is explicitly equivalent to that imposed on banks under Notice 626. There is no licence-tier carve-out for MPIs: a major payment institution must run monitoring that meets bank-grade expectations.

In practice, this is where many payment institutions fall short. [Transaction monitoring in the MAS context](/compliance-hub/transaction-monitoring-singapore-mas-requirements) requires calibrated alert logic, documented investigation workflows, and audit trails that MAS can review. Payment institutions often have none of these at the point of licence grant — they have the licence, but not the infrastructure.

3. Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR)

STR obligations do not come from the PSA itself — they come from the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (CDSA). Section 39 of the CDSA requires any person who knows or has reasonable grounds to suspect that property represents proceeds of drug trafficking or other serious crimes to file a report with the Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office (STRO).

The practical timeline is one business day from the point at which suspicion forms. That formation date matters: MAS examination findings have treated cases where the suspicion formation date was left blank or set to the date of filing (rather than the date of the underlying discovery) as incomplete reports — even where the filing itself was technically made within the window.

4. Record-Keeping

CDD documents and transaction records must be retained for five years from the date the transaction was conducted or the business relationship ended. MAS can request records going back up to five years in the course of an examination.

One PSN01 Obligation Per Service

PSN01 contains a provision that compliance teams at multi-service payment institutions sometimes miss: a firm licensed to provide both cross-border money transfer services and e-money issuance services must comply with PSN01 separately for each service. CDD performed for a customer under the cross-border transfer service does not automatically satisfy CDD requirements for the same customer's e-money transactions. The records, processes, and monitoring must address each licensed service independently.

MAS Notice PSN02: DPT Service Providers

MAS Notice PSN02 — "Prevention of Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism — Holders of a Standard Payment Institution Licence or Major Payment Institution Licence Carrying on Digital Payment Token Service" — applies to firms licensed to offer DPT services: crypto exchanges, digital asset custodians, and related providers.

PSN02 carries higher-risk obligations than PSN01, reflecting MAS's view that DPT services present specific money laundering and terrorism financing risks not present in traditional payment services.

The additional obligations under PSN02 include:

Travel Rule compliance: PSN02 implements FATF Recommendation 16 for virtual assets. Licensed DPT service providers must collect, verify, and transmit originator and beneficiary information for DPT transfers above SGD 1,500. For transfers to or from unhosted wallets (wallets not held at a licensed provider), enhanced procedures apply. MAS has not mandated a specific technical standard for travel rule compliance, but expects firms to use an approved solution with documented coverage for the counterparty jurisdictions they transact with.

Blockchain-specific monitoring: Alert logic for DPT transactions must address blockchain-native risk indicators — rapid multi-hop transfers across wallets, use of mixing or tumbling services, high-velocity micro-transactions consistent with layering, and activity consistent with known illicit addresses. Standard bank transaction monitoring typologies do not map cleanly to on-chain behaviour, and PSN02 examiners expect DPT-specific rule sets.

Heightened examination intensity post-2022: Following the collapse of FTX in November 2022 and MAS's subsequent review of licensed DPT providers, MAS substantially increased the frequency and depth of PSN02 examinations. Several DPT licence holders received remediation requirements in 2023 and 2024. STR filing quality and travel rule implementation were the two most commonly cited deficiencies.

CDD Under the PSA: What the Thresholds Mean in Practice

The SGD 1,500 occasional transaction threshold in PSN01 is one of the more misunderstood elements of the PSA framework.

Under Notice 626, banks do not need to apply full CDD to occasional transactions below SGD 5,000. Payment institutions under PSN01 must apply CDD at SGD 1,500. That is not a minor administrative difference. In a remittance business processing hundreds of transactions daily, a significant proportion of transactions will fall between SGD 1,500 and SGD 5,000. Each of those requires customer identification and verification under PSN01 — which requires a technology and process infrastructure that can handle that volume.

In examination, MAS specifically checks whether SGD 1,500 thresholds are being applied in practice — not just whether the institution's CDD policy says they should be. The gap between policy and operational execution is a recurring finding.

For KYC processes at licensed payment institutions, the relevant question is not just whether the institution can identify a customer, but whether the identification is being triggered at the correct transaction threshold, documented correctly, and linked to the transaction monitoring record.

Transaction Monitoring: Where Payment Institutions Fall Short

MAS's 2024 supervisory expectations document specifically noted that transaction monitoring at payment institutions is "less mature" than at banks. This is both a diagnostic and a warning — MAS has signalled that payment institution TM controls are now an examination priority.

Three factors make transaction monitoring operationally harder for payment institutions than for banks:

Shorter customer history: Banks accumulate years of transaction history per customer before alerts are calibrated. Many payment institution customers have been active for months. Baseline behaviour is harder to establish, which means both that unusual patterns are harder to identify and that alert false positive rates tend to be higher.

Faster transaction cycles: Payment transactions settle in minutes or seconds. A structuring pattern that would take weeks to manifest in a bank account can appear and disappear in a payment institution in 48 hours. Monitoring rules must be configured to detect compressed timescales.

Higher cross-border exposure: Cross-border money transfer services, by definition, move funds across jurisdictions — often to markets with weaker AML frameworks. Alert rules for cross-border transfers need jurisdiction-specific calibration, not a single global threshold.

The full MAS transaction monitoring framework covers how these factors should be addressed in a Singapore-compliant monitoring programme.

What MAS Examines at PSA-Licensed Firms

Based on published MAS supervisory findings and the 2024 expectations document, PSA examinations focus on five areas:

CDD threshold application: Are SGD 1,500 triggers actually running in production? Examiners test this by pulling a sample of transactions in the SGD 1,500–5,000 range and checking whether CDD was conducted and documented.

Travel rule compliance for cross-border transfers: For MPI-licensed firms providing cross-border money transfer services, examiners check whether FATF Recommendation 16 originator/beneficiary information is being collected, verified, and transmitted — and whether the institution has procedures for counterparties who cannot receive travel rule data.

STR filing quality: MAS does not measure STR performance primarily by volume. Examiners look at the narrative content of individual STR filings — specifically whether the filing documents the basis for suspicion, the investigation steps taken, and the transaction evidence reviewed. Filings that state "suspicious activity detected" without specifying what made the activity suspicious are treated as incomplete, regardless of whether they were filed on time.

Alert calibration for payment-specific typologies: Generic bank-derived alert rules applied without adaptation are a common finding. Examiners look for rules that address mule account patterns in remittance flows (rapid inbound/outbound cycling with no retention), sub-threshold structuring designed to avoid PSN01 CDD triggers, and rapid account turnover in payment accounts.

PS(A)A 2021 compliance: The 2021 amendment extended PSA coverage to previously unregulated services and increased MAS supervisory powers, including the ability to impose restrictions on MPI licence holders mid-licence. Firms that were operating before the amendment took effect and were brought within scope had a transition period — but that period has elapsed. Any firm that believes its legacy service structure still falls outside the PSA framework should obtain current legal advice.

The 2021 Amendment: What Changed

The Payment Services (Amendment) Act 2021 made three changes relevant to AML compliance:

First, it extended the PSA's regulated activity definitions to capture services previously argued to be outside scope — in particular, certain token-based payment services and digital representation of fiat currency.

Second, it introduced new obligations for DPT service providers, bringing Singapore into alignment with FATF's revised Recommendation 15 on virtual assets. This is the legislative foundation for PSN02 and its enhanced requirements.

Third, it expanded MAS's supervisory toolkit. Under the amended Act, MAS can impose conditions on MPI licences that restrict specific product lines or transaction types while an investigation or remediation is ongoing. This is a more targeted instrument than suspension, and MAS has used it in at least two disclosed cases since 2022.

Building Compliance Infrastructure That Meets PSA Expectations

A PSA licence is not a compliance programme. The licence grants permission to operate; the AML/CFT framework is built after that.

For newly licensed MPIs and SPIs, the gap between what MAS requires and what most firms have at licence grant is significant. PSN01 requires calibrated transaction monitoring, documented CDD at SGD 1,500 thresholds, investigation workflows that leave auditable records, and STR filings with substantive narrative content. These are not features that come pre-configured — they require technology, process design, and trained personnel.

If you are building or evaluating a transaction monitoring programme for a Singapore-licensed payment institution, the Transaction Monitoring Software Buyer's Guide covers what to look for in a system designed for payment services risk — including alert calibration for remittance typologies, travel rule integration, and MAS-examination-ready documentation.

For compliance teams at payment institutions assessing whether their current controls meet MAS's 2024 supervisory expectations, Tookitaki works with licensed payment institutions in Singapore to implement AML/CFT programmes built for PSN01 and PSN02 requirements. Book a demo to see how FinCense addresses payment-specific transaction monitoring and STR documentation.