Uncovering COVID Fund Laundering Schemes Through Investment Platforms
Fraud targeting governments’ pandemic-related welfare programs have seen criminals exploiting these schemes ever since countries started helping their citizens and businesses. If reports are correct, fraudsters benefit immensely from the US government’s strategies to aid businesses affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Also, they are making use of popular online investment platforms as a convenient way to launder money. According to a CNBC report, citing law enforcement officials, more than US$100 million in stolen COVID relief funds have gone through four investment platforms – Robinhood, TD Ameritrade, E-Trade and Fidelity – since Congress passed the CARES Act in March 2020.
The US government’s rapid roll-out of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and the Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) has been criticised as the “financial crime bonanza act of 2021”, with the programs marred with problems. The PPP allows eligible small businesses and other organisations to receive loans with a maturity of two years and an interest rate of one per cent. The EIDL program provides economic relief to small businesses that are currently experiencing a temporary loss of revenue. Inadequate controls have been cited for aiding possible fraud totalling billions of dollars. The officials noted that new-age digital investment platforms are easy options “to dump the money into by setting up accounts with stolen identities”.
This article explores the fraudsters’ schemes to benefit from government programs and clean those funds illegally. Also, we look into the technology options these investment platforms could use to counter financial crime and ensure robust AML/CFT compliance.
Learn More: Latest AML Fine Figures
Typology involving online investment platforms
The fraud and money laundering scheme works as below:
- Criminals steal a business owner’s identity and apply for EIDL.
- Once they get the funds, the criminals again use stolen identity information such as date of birth and social security number to open an investment account at an online investment platform.
- In some cases, criminals use synthetic identity, a fictitious social security number tied to a real person or mules who are part of the scheme.
- Then, criminals would transfer EIDL funds from bank accounts to accounts opened with online investment platforms.
- A short time later, the funds are moved from online investment accounts using ACH reversal.
CNBC’s sources noted that criminals are taking advantage of the more straightforward sign-up process for online investment accounts as well as the relative anonymity compared with regular bank account. One of the officials cited by CNBC said they are “investigating several cases where Robinhood had been used by criminals to launder PPP funds and EIDL funds”. In one of the cases, a fraudster stole the identity of a local resident and was able to receive US$28,000 in EIDL funds, obtained using fraudulent information for a nonexistent business with 60 employees. The fraudster later opened an account with Robinhood and attempted to transfer most of the money from a bank account using a stolen identity. Then the fraudster reversed the transfer three days after opening the account using an ACH reversal.
Considerable Amounts Being Diverted to New Avenues
CNBC sources said criminals are using all the different platforms because of the sheer volume of the stimulus package and the amount of money. The PPP and EIDL programs have fraud identified worth US$84 billion, out of which only US$626 million have been seized or forfeited by the Department of Justice, according to the US House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis. The Subcommittee also noted that Financial institutions filed over 41,000 Suspicious Activity Reports related to potential PPP and EIDL fraud during May-October 2020 alone.
PPP & EIDL Fraud by Type

Source: US House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis
The PPP established by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act was a prime target for fraud due to its limited oversight and easy eligibility criteria. The program's original allocation of US$349 billion was depleted in just 13 days. Once the relief programs’ weak controls became evident, the US Department of Treasury and the Department of Justice (DOJ) realised that they would need to take an aggressive approach to prevent fraud and started auditing applications and prosecuting wrongdoers. The charges on those people caught by law enforcement include bank fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and making false statements to financial institutions. In 2020, the DOJ charged over 100 people for fraudulently seeking loans and other payments under the CARES Act.
Importance of Sustainable AML Compliance Programs within Online Investment Platforms
The online investment platforms, named in the CNBC report, claimed they are “laser-focused on preventing fraud” and have a “range of safeguards and multiple layers of security in place for detecting fraudulent accounts and subsequent transactions” as in the case of other financial institutions. However, their AML/CFT measures’ effectiveness is in question, especially in the pandemic’s new status quo. To remain trustworthy, these platforms need to mitigate money laundering risks through effective and sustainable compliance programs.
A proper AML Compliance Program enables a financial institution to identify and respond to terrorist financing and money laundering risks by introducing a risk-based approach in various key processes such as Know Your Customer (KYC), Customer Due Diligence (CDD), Screening and Transaction Monitoring.
Tookitaki’s end-to-end AI-powered AML operating system, the Anti-Money Laundering Suite (AMLS), powered by the AFC Ecosystem is intended to identify hard-to-detect money laundering techniques. Available as a modular service across the three pillars of AML activity – Transaction Monitoring, AML Screening for names and transactions and Customer Risk Scoring – the solution has the following features to aid in detecting money laundering.
- The World’s most extensive repository of AML typologies provides real-world AML red flags to keep our underlying machine learning detection model updated with the latest money laundering techniques globally.
- Advanced data analytics and dynamic segmentation to detect unusual patterns in transactions
- Risk scoring based on matching with watchlist databases or adverse media
- Visibility on customer linkages and related scores to provide a 360-degree network overview
- Constantly updating risk scoring, which learns from incremental data changes
Our solution has been proven to be highly accurate in identifying high-risk customers and transactions. For more details on our AMLS solution and its ability to identify various money laundering techniques, don't hesitate to contact us.
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When Money Moves Like Business: Inside Taipei’s $970 Million Gambling Laundering Network
1. Introduction to the Case
At the start of 2026, prosecutors in Taipei uncovered a money laundering operation so extensive that its scale alone commanded attention. Nearly NT$30.6 billion, about US$970 million, allegedly moved through the financial system under the guise of ordinary business activity, tied to illegal online gambling operations.
There were no obvious warning signs at first glance. Transactions flowed through payment platforms that looked commercial. Accounts behaved like those of legitimate merchants. A well-known restaurant operated openly, serving customers while quietly anchoring a complex financial network behind the scenes.
What made this case remarkable was not just the volume of illicit funds, but how convincingly they blended into routine economic activity. The money did not rush through obscure channels or sit dormant in hidden accounts. It moved steadily, predictably, and efficiently, much like revenue generated by a real business.
By January 2026, authorities had indicted 35 individuals, bringing years of quiet laundering activity into the open. The case serves as a stark reminder for compliance leaders and financial institutions. The most dangerous laundering schemes today do not look criminal.
They look operational.

2. Anatomy of the Laundering Operation
Unlike traditional laundering schemes that rely on abusing existing financial services, this alleged operation was built around direct ownership and control of payment infrastructure.
Step 1: Building the Payment Layer
Prosecutors allege that the network developed custom payment platforms specifically designed to handle gambling-related funds. These platforms acted as controlled gateways between illegal online gambling sites and regulated financial institutions.
By owning the payment layer, the network could shape how transactions appeared externally. Deposits resembled routine consumer payments rather than gambling stakes. Withdrawals appeared as standard platform disbursements rather than illicit winnings.
The laundering began not after the money entered the system, but at the moment it was framed.
Step 2: Ingesting Illegal Gambling Proceeds
Illegal online gambling platforms operating across multiple jurisdictions reportedly channelled funds into these payment systems. To banks and payment institutions, the activity did not immediately resemble gambling-related flows.
By separating the criminal source of funds from their visible transaction trail, the network reduced contextual clarity early in the lifecycle.
The risk signal weakened with every step removed from the original activity.
Step 3: Using a Restaurant as a Front Business
A legitimate restaurant allegedly played a central role in anchoring the operation. Physical businesses do more than provide cover. They provide credibility.
The restaurant justified the presence of merchant accounts, payment terminals, staff activity, supplier payments, and fluctuating revenue. It created a believable operational backdrop against which large transaction volumes could exist without immediate suspicion.
The business did not replace laundering mechanics.
It normalised them.
Step 4: Rapid Routing and Pass-Through Behaviour
Funds reportedly moved quickly through accounts linked to the payment platforms. Incoming deposits were followed by structured transfers and payouts to downstream accounts, including e-wallets and other financial channels.
High-volume pass-through behaviour limited residual balances and reduced the exposure of any single account. Money rarely paused long enough to draw attention.
Movement itself became the camouflage.
Step 5: Detection and Indictment
Over time, the scale and coordination of activity attracted scrutiny. Prosecutors allege that transaction patterns, account linkages, and platform behaviour revealed a level of organisation inconsistent with legitimate commerce.
In January 2026, authorities announced the indictment of 35 individuals, marking the end of an operation that had quietly integrated itself into everyday financial flows.
The network did not fail because one transaction was flagged.
It failed because the overall pattern stopped making sense.
3. Why This Worked: Control and Credibility
This alleged laundering operation succeeded because it exploited structural assumptions within the financial system rather than technical loopholes.
1. Control of the Transaction Narrative
When criminals control the payment platform, they control how transactions are described, timed, and routed. Labels, settlement patterns, and counterparty relationships all shape perception.
Compliance systems often assess risk against stated business models. In this case, the business model itself was engineered to appear plausible.
2. Trust in Commercial Interfaces
Payments that resemble everyday commerce attract less scrutiny than transactions explicitly linked to gambling or other high-risk activities. Familiar interfaces reduce friction, both for users and for monitoring systems.
Legitimacy was embedded into the design.
3. Fragmented Oversight
Different institutions saw different fragments of the activity. Banks observed account behaviour. Payment institutions saw transaction flows. The restaurant appeared as a normal merchant.
No single entity had a complete view of the end-to-end lifecycle of funds.
4. Scale Without Sudden Noise
Rather than relying on sudden spikes or extreme anomalies, the operation allegedly scaled steadily. This gradual growth allowed transaction patterns to blend into evolving baselines.
Risk accumulated quietly, over time.
4. The Financial Crime Lens Behind the Case
While the predicate offence was illegal gambling, the mechanics of this case reflect broader shifts in financial crime.
1. Infrastructure-Led Laundering
This was not simply the misuse of existing systems. It was the deliberate creation of infrastructure designed to launder money at scale.
Similar patterns are increasingly observed in scam facilitation networks, mule orchestration platforms, and illicit payment services operating across borders.
2. Payment Laundering Over Account Laundering
The focus moved away from individual accounts toward transaction ecosystems. Ownership of flow mattered more than ownership of balances.
Risk became behavioural rather than static.
3. Front Businesses as Integration Points
Legitimate enterprises increasingly serve as anchors where illicit and legitimate funds coexist. This integration blurs the boundary between clean and dirty money, making detection more complex.

5. Red Flags for Banks, Fintechs, and Regulators
This case highlights signals that extend beyond gambling environments.
A. Behavioural Red Flags
- High-volume transaction flows with limited value retention
- Consistent routing patterns across diverse counterparties
- Predictable timing and structuring inconsistent with consumer behaviour
B. Operational Red Flags
- Payment platforms scaling rapidly without proportional business visibility
- Merchants behaving like processors rather than sellers
- Front businesses supporting transaction volumes beyond physical capacity
C. Financial Red Flags
- Large pass-through volumes with minimal margin retention
- Rapid distribution of incoming funds across multiple channels
- Cross-border flows misaligned with stated business geography
Individually, these indicators may appear benign. Together, they tell a story.
6. How Tookitaki Strengthens Defences
Cases like this reinforce why financial crime prevention must evolve beyond static rules and isolated monitoring.
1. Scenario-Driven Intelligence from the AFC Ecosystem
Expert-contributed scenarios capture complex laundering patterns that traditional typologies often miss, including platform-led and infrastructure-driven crime.
These insights help institutions recognise emerging risks earlier in the transaction lifecycle.
2. Behavioural Pattern Recognition
Tookitaki’s approach prioritises flow behaviour, coordination, and lifecycle anomalies rather than focusing solely on transaction values.
When money stops behaving like commerce, the signal emerges early.
3. Cross-Domain Risk Thinking
The same intelligence principles used to detect scam networks, mule rings, and high-velocity fraud apply equally to sophisticated laundering operations hidden behind legitimate interfaces.
Financial crime rarely fits neatly into one category. Detection should not either.
7. Conclusion
The Taipei case is a reminder that modern money laundering no longer relies on secrecy alone.
Sometimes, it relies on efficiency.
This alleged operation blended controlled payment infrastructure, credible business fronts, and transaction flows engineered to look routine. It did not disrupt the system. It embedded itself within it.
As 2026 unfolds, financial institutions face a clear challenge. The most serious laundering risks will not always announce themselves through obvious anomalies. They will appear as businesses that scale smoothly, transact confidently, and behave just convincingly enough to be trusted.
When money moves like business, the warning is already there.

When Luck Isn’t Luck: Inside the Crown Casino Deception That Fooled the House
1. Introduction to the Scam
In October 2025, a luxury casino overlooking Sydney Harbour became the unlikely stage for one of Australia’s most unusual fraud cases of the year 2025.
There were no phishing links, fake investment platforms, or anonymous scam calls. Instead, the deception unfolded in plain sight across gaming tables, surveillance cameras, and whispered instructions delivered through hidden earpieces.
What initially appeared to be an extraordinary winning streak soon revealed something far more calculated. Over a series of gambling sessions, a visiting couple allegedly accumulated more than A$1.17 million in winnings at Crown Sydney. By late November, the pattern had raised enough concern for casino staff to alert authorities.
The couple were subsequently arrested and charged by New South Wales Police for allegedly dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage by deception.
This was not a random act of cheating.
It was an alleged technology-assisted, coordinated deception, executed with precision, speed, and behavioural discipline.
The case challenges a common assumption in financial crime. Fraud does not always originate online. Sometimes, it operates openly, exploiting trust in physical presence and gaps in behavioural monitoring.

2. Anatomy of the Scam
Unlike digital payment fraud, this alleged scheme relied on physical execution, real-time coordination, and human decision-making, making it harder to detect in its early stages.
Step 1: Strategic Entry and Short-Term Targeting
The couple arrived in Sydney in October 2025 and began visiting the casino shortly after. Short-stay visitors with no local transaction history often present limited behavioural baselines, particularly in hospitality and gaming environments.
This lack of historical context created an ideal entry point.
Step 2: Use of Covert Recording Devices
Casino staff later identified suspicious equipment allegedly used during gameplay. Police reportedly seized:
- A small concealed camera attached to clothing
- A modified mobile phone with recording attachments
- Custom-built mirrors and magnetised tools
These devices allegedly allowed the capture of live game information not normally accessible to players.
Step 3: Real-Time Remote Coordination
The couple allegedly wore concealed earpieces during play, suggesting live communication with external accomplices. This setup would have enabled:
- Real-time interpretation of captured visuals
- Calculation of betting advantages
- Immediate signalling of wagering decisions
This was not instinct or chance.
It was alleged external intelligence delivered in real time.
Step 4: Repeated High-Value Wins
Across multiple sessions in October and November 2025, the couple reportedly amassed winnings exceeding A$1.17 million. The consistency and scale of success eventually triggered internal alerts within the casino’s surveillance and risk teams.
At this point, the pattern itself became the red flag.
Step 5: Detection and Arrest
Casino staff escalated their concerns to law enforcement. On 27 November 2025, NSW Police arrested the couple, executed search warrants at their accommodation, and seized equipment, cash, and personal items.
The alleged deception ended not because probability failed, but because behaviour stopped making sense.
3. Why This Scam Worked: The Psychology at Play
This case allegedly succeeded because it exploited human assumptions rather than technical weaknesses.
1. The Luck Bias
Casinos are built on probability. Exceptional winning streaks are rare, but not impossible. That uncertainty creates a narrow window where deception can hide behind chance.
2. Trust in Physical Presence
Face-to-face activity feels legitimate. A well-presented individual at a gaming table attracts less suspicion than an anonymous digital transaction.
3. Fragmented Oversight
Unlike banks, where fraud teams monitor end-to-end flows, casinos distribute responsibility across:
- Dealers
- Floor supervisors
- Surveillance teams
- Risk and compliance units
This fragmentation can delay pattern recognition.
4. Short-Duration Execution
The alleged activity unfolded over weeks, not years. Short-lived, high-impact schemes often evade traditional threshold-based monitoring.
4. The Financial Crime Lens Behind the Case
While this incident occurred in a gambling environment, the mechanics closely mirror broader financial crime typologies.
1. Information Asymmetry Exploitation
Covert devices allegedly created an unfair informational advantage, similar to insider abuse or privileged data misuse in financial markets.
2. Real-Time Decision Exploitation
Live coordination and immediate action resemble:
- Authorised push payment fraud
- Account takeover orchestration
- Social engineering campaigns
Speed neutralised conventional controls.
3. Rapid Value Accumulation
Large gains over a compressed timeframe are classic precursors to:
- Asset conversion
- Laundering attempts
- Cross-border fund movement
Had the activity continued, the next phase could have involved integration into the broader financial system.

5. Red Flags for Casinos, Banks, and Regulators
This case highlights behavioural signals that extend well beyond gaming floors.
A. Behavioural Red Flags
- Highly consistent success rates across sessions
- Near-perfect timing of decisions
- Limited variance in betting behaviour
B. Operational Red Flags
- Concealed devices or unusual attire
- Repeated table changes followed by immediate wins
- Non-verbal coordination during gameplay
C. Financial Red Flags
- Sudden accumulation of high-value winnings
- Requests for rapid payout or conversion
- Intent to move value across borders shortly after gains
These indicators closely resemble red flags seen in mule networks and high-velocity fraud schemes.
6. How Tookitaki Strengthens Defences
This case reinforces why fraud prevention must move beyond channel-specific controls.
1. Scenario-Driven Intelligence from the AFC Ecosystem
Expert-contributed scenarios help institutions recognise patterns that fall outside traditional fraud categories, including:
- Behavioural precision
- Coordinated multi-actor execution
- Short-duration, high-impact schemes
2. Behavioural Pattern Recognition
Tookitaki’s intelligence approach prioritises:
- Probability-defying outcomes
- Decision timing anomalies
- Consistency where randomness should exist
These signals often surface risk before losses escalate.
3. Cross-Domain Fraud Thinking
The same intelligence principles used to detect:
- Account takeovers
- Payment scams
- Mule networks
are equally applicable to non-traditional environments where value moves quickly.
Fraud is no longer confined to banks. Detection should not be either.
7. Conclusion
The Crown Sydney deception case is a reminder that modern fraud does not always arrive through screens, links, or malware.
Sometimes, it walks confidently through the front door.
This alleged scheme relied on behavioural discipline, real-time coordination, and technological advantage, all hidden behind the illusion of chance.
As fraud techniques continue to evolve, institutions must look beyond static rules and siloed monitoring. The future of fraud prevention lies in understanding behaviour, recognising improbable patterns, and sharing intelligence across ecosystems.
Because when luck stops looking like luck, the signal is already there.

Singapore’s Financial Shield: Choosing the Right AML Compliance Software Solutions
When trust is currency, AML compliance becomes your strongest asset.
In Singapore’s fast-evolving financial ecosystem, the battle against money laundering is intensifying. With MAS ramping up expectations and international regulators scrutinising cross-border flows, financial institutions must act decisively. Manual processes and outdated tools are no longer enough. What’s needed is a modern, intelligent, and adaptable approach—enter AML compliance software solutions.
This blog takes a close look at what makes a strong AML compliance software solution, the features to prioritise, and how Singapore’s institutions can future-proof their compliance programmes.

Why AML Compliance Software Solutions Matter in Singapore
Singapore is a major financial hub, but that status also makes it a high-risk jurisdiction for complex money laundering techniques. From trade-based laundering and shell companies to cyber-enabled fraud, financial crime threats are becoming more global, fast-moving, and tech-driven.
According to the latest MAS Money Laundering Risk Assessment, sectors like banking and cross-border payments are under increasing pressure. Institutions need:
- Real-time visibility into suspicious behaviour
- Lower false positives
- Faster reporting turnaround
- Cost-effective compliance
The right AML software offers all of this—when chosen well.
What is AML Compliance Software?
AML compliance software refers to digital platforms designed to help financial institutions detect, investigate, report, and prevent financial crime in line with regulatory requirements. These systems combine rule-based logic, machine learning, and scenario-based monitoring to provide end-to-end compliance coverage.
Key use cases include:
- Customer due diligence (CDD)
- Transaction monitoring
- Case management
- Sanctions and watchlist screening
- Regulatory reporting (STR/SAR generation)
Core Features to Look for in AML Compliance Software Solutions
Not all AML platforms are created equal. Here are the top features your solution must have:
1. Real-Time Transaction Monitoring
The ability to flag suspicious activities as they happen—especially critical in high-risk verticals such as remittance, retail banking, and digital assets.
2. Risk-Based Approach
Modern systems allow for dynamic risk scoring based on customer behaviour, transaction patterns, and geographical exposure. This enables prioritised investigations.
3. AI and Machine Learning Models
Look for adaptive learning capabilities that improve accuracy over time, helping to reduce false positives and uncover previously unseen threats.
4. Integrated Screening Engine
Your system should seamlessly screen customers and transactions against global sanctions lists, PEPs, and adverse media sources.
5. End-to-End Case Management
From alert generation to case disposition and reporting, the platform should provide a unified workflow that helps analysts move faster.
6. Regulatory Alignment
Built-in compliance with local MAS guidelines (such as PSN02, AML Notices, and STR filing requirements) is essential for institutions in Singapore.
7. Explainability and Auditability
Tools that provide clear reasoning behind alerts and decisions can ensure internal transparency and regulatory acceptance.

Common Challenges in AML Compliance
Singaporean financial institutions often face the following hurdles:
- High false positive rates
- Fragmented data systems across business lines
- Manual case reviews slowing down investigations
- Delayed or inaccurate regulatory reports
- Difficulty adjusting to new typologies or scams
These challenges aren’t just operational—they can lead to regulatory penalties, reputational damage, and lost customer trust. AML software solutions address these pain points by introducing automation, intelligence, and scalability.
How Tookitaki’s FinCense Delivers End-to-End AML Compliance
Tookitaki’s FinCense platform is purpose-built to solve compliance pain points faced by financial institutions across Singapore and the broader APAC region.
Key Benefits:
- Out-of-the-box scenarios from the AFC Ecosystem that adapt to new risk patterns
- Federated learning to improve model accuracy across institutions without compromising data privacy
- Smart Disposition Engine for automated case narration, regulatory reporting, and audit readiness
- Real-time monitoring with adaptive risk scoring and alert prioritisation
With FinCense, institutions have reported:
- 72% reduction in false positives
- 3.5x increase in analyst efficiency
- Greater regulator confidence due to better audit trails
FinCense isn’t just software—it’s a trust layer for modern financial crime prevention.
Best Practices for Evaluating AML Compliance Software
Before investing, financial institutions should ask:
- Does the software scale with your future growth and risk exposure?
- Can it localise to Singapore’s regulatory and typology landscape?
- Is the AI explainable, and is the platform auditable?
- Can it ingest external intelligence and industry scenarios?
- How quickly can you update detection rules based on new threats?
Singapore’s Regulatory Expectations
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has emphasised risk-based, tech-enabled compliance in its guidance. Recent thematic reviews and enforcement actions have highlighted the importance of:
- Timely Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STRs)
- Strong detection of mule accounts and digital fraud patterns
- Collaboration with industry peers to address cross-institution threats
AML software is no longer just about ticking boxes—it must show effectiveness, agility, and accountability.
Conclusion: Future-Ready Compliance Begins with the Right Tools
Singapore’s compliance landscape is becoming more complex, more real-time, and more collaborative. The right AML software helps financial institutions stay one step ahead—not just of regulators, but of financial criminals.
From screening to reporting, from risk scoring to AI-powered decisioning, AML compliance software solutions are no longer optional. They are mission-critical.
Choose wisely, and you don’t just meet compliance—you build competitive trust.

When Money Moves Like Business: Inside Taipei’s $970 Million Gambling Laundering Network
1. Introduction to the Case
At the start of 2026, prosecutors in Taipei uncovered a money laundering operation so extensive that its scale alone commanded attention. Nearly NT$30.6 billion, about US$970 million, allegedly moved through the financial system under the guise of ordinary business activity, tied to illegal online gambling operations.
There were no obvious warning signs at first glance. Transactions flowed through payment platforms that looked commercial. Accounts behaved like those of legitimate merchants. A well-known restaurant operated openly, serving customers while quietly anchoring a complex financial network behind the scenes.
What made this case remarkable was not just the volume of illicit funds, but how convincingly they blended into routine economic activity. The money did not rush through obscure channels or sit dormant in hidden accounts. It moved steadily, predictably, and efficiently, much like revenue generated by a real business.
By January 2026, authorities had indicted 35 individuals, bringing years of quiet laundering activity into the open. The case serves as a stark reminder for compliance leaders and financial institutions. The most dangerous laundering schemes today do not look criminal.
They look operational.

2. Anatomy of the Laundering Operation
Unlike traditional laundering schemes that rely on abusing existing financial services, this alleged operation was built around direct ownership and control of payment infrastructure.
Step 1: Building the Payment Layer
Prosecutors allege that the network developed custom payment platforms specifically designed to handle gambling-related funds. These platforms acted as controlled gateways between illegal online gambling sites and regulated financial institutions.
By owning the payment layer, the network could shape how transactions appeared externally. Deposits resembled routine consumer payments rather than gambling stakes. Withdrawals appeared as standard platform disbursements rather than illicit winnings.
The laundering began not after the money entered the system, but at the moment it was framed.
Step 2: Ingesting Illegal Gambling Proceeds
Illegal online gambling platforms operating across multiple jurisdictions reportedly channelled funds into these payment systems. To banks and payment institutions, the activity did not immediately resemble gambling-related flows.
By separating the criminal source of funds from their visible transaction trail, the network reduced contextual clarity early in the lifecycle.
The risk signal weakened with every step removed from the original activity.
Step 3: Using a Restaurant as a Front Business
A legitimate restaurant allegedly played a central role in anchoring the operation. Physical businesses do more than provide cover. They provide credibility.
The restaurant justified the presence of merchant accounts, payment terminals, staff activity, supplier payments, and fluctuating revenue. It created a believable operational backdrop against which large transaction volumes could exist without immediate suspicion.
The business did not replace laundering mechanics.
It normalised them.
Step 4: Rapid Routing and Pass-Through Behaviour
Funds reportedly moved quickly through accounts linked to the payment platforms. Incoming deposits were followed by structured transfers and payouts to downstream accounts, including e-wallets and other financial channels.
High-volume pass-through behaviour limited residual balances and reduced the exposure of any single account. Money rarely paused long enough to draw attention.
Movement itself became the camouflage.
Step 5: Detection and Indictment
Over time, the scale and coordination of activity attracted scrutiny. Prosecutors allege that transaction patterns, account linkages, and platform behaviour revealed a level of organisation inconsistent with legitimate commerce.
In January 2026, authorities announced the indictment of 35 individuals, marking the end of an operation that had quietly integrated itself into everyday financial flows.
The network did not fail because one transaction was flagged.
It failed because the overall pattern stopped making sense.
3. Why This Worked: Control and Credibility
This alleged laundering operation succeeded because it exploited structural assumptions within the financial system rather than technical loopholes.
1. Control of the Transaction Narrative
When criminals control the payment platform, they control how transactions are described, timed, and routed. Labels, settlement patterns, and counterparty relationships all shape perception.
Compliance systems often assess risk against stated business models. In this case, the business model itself was engineered to appear plausible.
2. Trust in Commercial Interfaces
Payments that resemble everyday commerce attract less scrutiny than transactions explicitly linked to gambling or other high-risk activities. Familiar interfaces reduce friction, both for users and for monitoring systems.
Legitimacy was embedded into the design.
3. Fragmented Oversight
Different institutions saw different fragments of the activity. Banks observed account behaviour. Payment institutions saw transaction flows. The restaurant appeared as a normal merchant.
No single entity had a complete view of the end-to-end lifecycle of funds.
4. Scale Without Sudden Noise
Rather than relying on sudden spikes or extreme anomalies, the operation allegedly scaled steadily. This gradual growth allowed transaction patterns to blend into evolving baselines.
Risk accumulated quietly, over time.
4. The Financial Crime Lens Behind the Case
While the predicate offence was illegal gambling, the mechanics of this case reflect broader shifts in financial crime.
1. Infrastructure-Led Laundering
This was not simply the misuse of existing systems. It was the deliberate creation of infrastructure designed to launder money at scale.
Similar patterns are increasingly observed in scam facilitation networks, mule orchestration platforms, and illicit payment services operating across borders.
2. Payment Laundering Over Account Laundering
The focus moved away from individual accounts toward transaction ecosystems. Ownership of flow mattered more than ownership of balances.
Risk became behavioural rather than static.
3. Front Businesses as Integration Points
Legitimate enterprises increasingly serve as anchors where illicit and legitimate funds coexist. This integration blurs the boundary between clean and dirty money, making detection more complex.

5. Red Flags for Banks, Fintechs, and Regulators
This case highlights signals that extend beyond gambling environments.
A. Behavioural Red Flags
- High-volume transaction flows with limited value retention
- Consistent routing patterns across diverse counterparties
- Predictable timing and structuring inconsistent with consumer behaviour
B. Operational Red Flags
- Payment platforms scaling rapidly without proportional business visibility
- Merchants behaving like processors rather than sellers
- Front businesses supporting transaction volumes beyond physical capacity
C. Financial Red Flags
- Large pass-through volumes with minimal margin retention
- Rapid distribution of incoming funds across multiple channels
- Cross-border flows misaligned with stated business geography
Individually, these indicators may appear benign. Together, they tell a story.
6. How Tookitaki Strengthens Defences
Cases like this reinforce why financial crime prevention must evolve beyond static rules and isolated monitoring.
1. Scenario-Driven Intelligence from the AFC Ecosystem
Expert-contributed scenarios capture complex laundering patterns that traditional typologies often miss, including platform-led and infrastructure-driven crime.
These insights help institutions recognise emerging risks earlier in the transaction lifecycle.
2. Behavioural Pattern Recognition
Tookitaki’s approach prioritises flow behaviour, coordination, and lifecycle anomalies rather than focusing solely on transaction values.
When money stops behaving like commerce, the signal emerges early.
3. Cross-Domain Risk Thinking
The same intelligence principles used to detect scam networks, mule rings, and high-velocity fraud apply equally to sophisticated laundering operations hidden behind legitimate interfaces.
Financial crime rarely fits neatly into one category. Detection should not either.
7. Conclusion
The Taipei case is a reminder that modern money laundering no longer relies on secrecy alone.
Sometimes, it relies on efficiency.
This alleged operation blended controlled payment infrastructure, credible business fronts, and transaction flows engineered to look routine. It did not disrupt the system. It embedded itself within it.
As 2026 unfolds, financial institutions face a clear challenge. The most serious laundering risks will not always announce themselves through obvious anomalies. They will appear as businesses that scale smoothly, transact confidently, and behave just convincingly enough to be trusted.
When money moves like business, the warning is already there.

When Luck Isn’t Luck: Inside the Crown Casino Deception That Fooled the House
1. Introduction to the Scam
In October 2025, a luxury casino overlooking Sydney Harbour became the unlikely stage for one of Australia’s most unusual fraud cases of the year 2025.
There were no phishing links, fake investment platforms, or anonymous scam calls. Instead, the deception unfolded in plain sight across gaming tables, surveillance cameras, and whispered instructions delivered through hidden earpieces.
What initially appeared to be an extraordinary winning streak soon revealed something far more calculated. Over a series of gambling sessions, a visiting couple allegedly accumulated more than A$1.17 million in winnings at Crown Sydney. By late November, the pattern had raised enough concern for casino staff to alert authorities.
The couple were subsequently arrested and charged by New South Wales Police for allegedly dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage by deception.
This was not a random act of cheating.
It was an alleged technology-assisted, coordinated deception, executed with precision, speed, and behavioural discipline.
The case challenges a common assumption in financial crime. Fraud does not always originate online. Sometimes, it operates openly, exploiting trust in physical presence and gaps in behavioural monitoring.

2. Anatomy of the Scam
Unlike digital payment fraud, this alleged scheme relied on physical execution, real-time coordination, and human decision-making, making it harder to detect in its early stages.
Step 1: Strategic Entry and Short-Term Targeting
The couple arrived in Sydney in October 2025 and began visiting the casino shortly after. Short-stay visitors with no local transaction history often present limited behavioural baselines, particularly in hospitality and gaming environments.
This lack of historical context created an ideal entry point.
Step 2: Use of Covert Recording Devices
Casino staff later identified suspicious equipment allegedly used during gameplay. Police reportedly seized:
- A small concealed camera attached to clothing
- A modified mobile phone with recording attachments
- Custom-built mirrors and magnetised tools
These devices allegedly allowed the capture of live game information not normally accessible to players.
Step 3: Real-Time Remote Coordination
The couple allegedly wore concealed earpieces during play, suggesting live communication with external accomplices. This setup would have enabled:
- Real-time interpretation of captured visuals
- Calculation of betting advantages
- Immediate signalling of wagering decisions
This was not instinct or chance.
It was alleged external intelligence delivered in real time.
Step 4: Repeated High-Value Wins
Across multiple sessions in October and November 2025, the couple reportedly amassed winnings exceeding A$1.17 million. The consistency and scale of success eventually triggered internal alerts within the casino’s surveillance and risk teams.
At this point, the pattern itself became the red flag.
Step 5: Detection and Arrest
Casino staff escalated their concerns to law enforcement. On 27 November 2025, NSW Police arrested the couple, executed search warrants at their accommodation, and seized equipment, cash, and personal items.
The alleged deception ended not because probability failed, but because behaviour stopped making sense.
3. Why This Scam Worked: The Psychology at Play
This case allegedly succeeded because it exploited human assumptions rather than technical weaknesses.
1. The Luck Bias
Casinos are built on probability. Exceptional winning streaks are rare, but not impossible. That uncertainty creates a narrow window where deception can hide behind chance.
2. Trust in Physical Presence
Face-to-face activity feels legitimate. A well-presented individual at a gaming table attracts less suspicion than an anonymous digital transaction.
3. Fragmented Oversight
Unlike banks, where fraud teams monitor end-to-end flows, casinos distribute responsibility across:
- Dealers
- Floor supervisors
- Surveillance teams
- Risk and compliance units
This fragmentation can delay pattern recognition.
4. Short-Duration Execution
The alleged activity unfolded over weeks, not years. Short-lived, high-impact schemes often evade traditional threshold-based monitoring.
4. The Financial Crime Lens Behind the Case
While this incident occurred in a gambling environment, the mechanics closely mirror broader financial crime typologies.
1. Information Asymmetry Exploitation
Covert devices allegedly created an unfair informational advantage, similar to insider abuse or privileged data misuse in financial markets.
2. Real-Time Decision Exploitation
Live coordination and immediate action resemble:
- Authorised push payment fraud
- Account takeover orchestration
- Social engineering campaigns
Speed neutralised conventional controls.
3. Rapid Value Accumulation
Large gains over a compressed timeframe are classic precursors to:
- Asset conversion
- Laundering attempts
- Cross-border fund movement
Had the activity continued, the next phase could have involved integration into the broader financial system.

5. Red Flags for Casinos, Banks, and Regulators
This case highlights behavioural signals that extend well beyond gaming floors.
A. Behavioural Red Flags
- Highly consistent success rates across sessions
- Near-perfect timing of decisions
- Limited variance in betting behaviour
B. Operational Red Flags
- Concealed devices or unusual attire
- Repeated table changes followed by immediate wins
- Non-verbal coordination during gameplay
C. Financial Red Flags
- Sudden accumulation of high-value winnings
- Requests for rapid payout or conversion
- Intent to move value across borders shortly after gains
These indicators closely resemble red flags seen in mule networks and high-velocity fraud schemes.
6. How Tookitaki Strengthens Defences
This case reinforces why fraud prevention must move beyond channel-specific controls.
1. Scenario-Driven Intelligence from the AFC Ecosystem
Expert-contributed scenarios help institutions recognise patterns that fall outside traditional fraud categories, including:
- Behavioural precision
- Coordinated multi-actor execution
- Short-duration, high-impact schemes
2. Behavioural Pattern Recognition
Tookitaki’s intelligence approach prioritises:
- Probability-defying outcomes
- Decision timing anomalies
- Consistency where randomness should exist
These signals often surface risk before losses escalate.
3. Cross-Domain Fraud Thinking
The same intelligence principles used to detect:
- Account takeovers
- Payment scams
- Mule networks
are equally applicable to non-traditional environments where value moves quickly.
Fraud is no longer confined to banks. Detection should not be either.
7. Conclusion
The Crown Sydney deception case is a reminder that modern fraud does not always arrive through screens, links, or malware.
Sometimes, it walks confidently through the front door.
This alleged scheme relied on behavioural discipline, real-time coordination, and technological advantage, all hidden behind the illusion of chance.
As fraud techniques continue to evolve, institutions must look beyond static rules and siloed monitoring. The future of fraud prevention lies in understanding behaviour, recognising improbable patterns, and sharing intelligence across ecosystems.
Because when luck stops looking like luck, the signal is already there.

Singapore’s Financial Shield: Choosing the Right AML Compliance Software Solutions
When trust is currency, AML compliance becomes your strongest asset.
In Singapore’s fast-evolving financial ecosystem, the battle against money laundering is intensifying. With MAS ramping up expectations and international regulators scrutinising cross-border flows, financial institutions must act decisively. Manual processes and outdated tools are no longer enough. What’s needed is a modern, intelligent, and adaptable approach—enter AML compliance software solutions.
This blog takes a close look at what makes a strong AML compliance software solution, the features to prioritise, and how Singapore’s institutions can future-proof their compliance programmes.

Why AML Compliance Software Solutions Matter in Singapore
Singapore is a major financial hub, but that status also makes it a high-risk jurisdiction for complex money laundering techniques. From trade-based laundering and shell companies to cyber-enabled fraud, financial crime threats are becoming more global, fast-moving, and tech-driven.
According to the latest MAS Money Laundering Risk Assessment, sectors like banking and cross-border payments are under increasing pressure. Institutions need:
- Real-time visibility into suspicious behaviour
- Lower false positives
- Faster reporting turnaround
- Cost-effective compliance
The right AML software offers all of this—when chosen well.
What is AML Compliance Software?
AML compliance software refers to digital platforms designed to help financial institutions detect, investigate, report, and prevent financial crime in line with regulatory requirements. These systems combine rule-based logic, machine learning, and scenario-based monitoring to provide end-to-end compliance coverage.
Key use cases include:
- Customer due diligence (CDD)
- Transaction monitoring
- Case management
- Sanctions and watchlist screening
- Regulatory reporting (STR/SAR generation)
Core Features to Look for in AML Compliance Software Solutions
Not all AML platforms are created equal. Here are the top features your solution must have:
1. Real-Time Transaction Monitoring
The ability to flag suspicious activities as they happen—especially critical in high-risk verticals such as remittance, retail banking, and digital assets.
2. Risk-Based Approach
Modern systems allow for dynamic risk scoring based on customer behaviour, transaction patterns, and geographical exposure. This enables prioritised investigations.
3. AI and Machine Learning Models
Look for adaptive learning capabilities that improve accuracy over time, helping to reduce false positives and uncover previously unseen threats.
4. Integrated Screening Engine
Your system should seamlessly screen customers and transactions against global sanctions lists, PEPs, and adverse media sources.
5. End-to-End Case Management
From alert generation to case disposition and reporting, the platform should provide a unified workflow that helps analysts move faster.
6. Regulatory Alignment
Built-in compliance with local MAS guidelines (such as PSN02, AML Notices, and STR filing requirements) is essential for institutions in Singapore.
7. Explainability and Auditability
Tools that provide clear reasoning behind alerts and decisions can ensure internal transparency and regulatory acceptance.

Common Challenges in AML Compliance
Singaporean financial institutions often face the following hurdles:
- High false positive rates
- Fragmented data systems across business lines
- Manual case reviews slowing down investigations
- Delayed or inaccurate regulatory reports
- Difficulty adjusting to new typologies or scams
These challenges aren’t just operational—they can lead to regulatory penalties, reputational damage, and lost customer trust. AML software solutions address these pain points by introducing automation, intelligence, and scalability.
How Tookitaki’s FinCense Delivers End-to-End AML Compliance
Tookitaki’s FinCense platform is purpose-built to solve compliance pain points faced by financial institutions across Singapore and the broader APAC region.
Key Benefits:
- Out-of-the-box scenarios from the AFC Ecosystem that adapt to new risk patterns
- Federated learning to improve model accuracy across institutions without compromising data privacy
- Smart Disposition Engine for automated case narration, regulatory reporting, and audit readiness
- Real-time monitoring with adaptive risk scoring and alert prioritisation
With FinCense, institutions have reported:
- 72% reduction in false positives
- 3.5x increase in analyst efficiency
- Greater regulator confidence due to better audit trails
FinCense isn’t just software—it’s a trust layer for modern financial crime prevention.
Best Practices for Evaluating AML Compliance Software
Before investing, financial institutions should ask:
- Does the software scale with your future growth and risk exposure?
- Can it localise to Singapore’s regulatory and typology landscape?
- Is the AI explainable, and is the platform auditable?
- Can it ingest external intelligence and industry scenarios?
- How quickly can you update detection rules based on new threats?
Singapore’s Regulatory Expectations
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has emphasised risk-based, tech-enabled compliance in its guidance. Recent thematic reviews and enforcement actions have highlighted the importance of:
- Timely Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STRs)
- Strong detection of mule accounts and digital fraud patterns
- Collaboration with industry peers to address cross-institution threats
AML software is no longer just about ticking boxes—it must show effectiveness, agility, and accountability.
Conclusion: Future-Ready Compliance Begins with the Right Tools
Singapore’s compliance landscape is becoming more complex, more real-time, and more collaborative. The right AML software helps financial institutions stay one step ahead—not just of regulators, but of financial criminals.
From screening to reporting, from risk scoring to AI-powered decisioning, AML compliance software solutions are no longer optional. They are mission-critical.
Choose wisely, and you don’t just meet compliance—you build competitive trust.


