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A Guide To Anti-Money Laundering In Indonesia

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Tookitaki
26 September 2022
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8 min

The largest economy in Southeast Asia is Indonesia, which has a GDP of over 1 billion US dollars. Due to the country's strong economy, Indonesia is also a G20 member. The country is vulnerable to financial crimes as a result of the money flow through it.

Indonesia was added to the FATF's "blacklist" of nations with a high risk of money laundering in 2012, and it was later taken off the list in 2015. 2018 saw the FATF admit Indonesia as an observer member.

APG, an organisation that localises FATF compliances in the Asia/Pacific region, and an associate member of FATF, both have Indonesia as a member state.

Indonesia is improving its ability to address vulnerabilities. There is generally a high level of technical compliance with anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards, and authorities continue to develop regulations that are geared toward a risk-based approach. Only slight changes are required in terms of the coordination between the public and private sectors of the economy.

 

International Perception

The Basel AML index 2021, a global index of measuring AML/CFT risks of countries, ranks Indonesia at 76 in a list of 110 countries with the highest AML risk. The Basel AML Index measures the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing(ML / TF) in jurisdictions around the world. It is based on a composite methodology, with 17 indicators categorised into five domains in line with the five key factors considered to contribute to a high risk of ML/TF. It scores Indonesia 4.68 out of 10 (10 being the highest). This puts Indonesia in the medium-risk category.

Indonesia is categorised by the US Department of State Money Laundering assessment (INCSR) as a country/jurisdiction of primary concern in respect of Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

 

Existing AML Framework in Indonesia

FATF Compliance In Indonesia

The international standard for the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism has been established by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which is a 33-member organisation with primary responsibility for developing a world-wide standard for anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. The FATF was established by the G-7 Summit in Paris in 1989 and works in close cooperation with other key international organisations, including the IMF, the World Bank, the United Nations, and FATF-style regional bodies.

Indonesia is the only G20 member country that has not been a member of FATF, but an observer.

To support its application for FATF membership, Indonesia strengthened its AML regulations in 2017. According to the new rules:

  • To increase administrative transparency, all non-bank financial institutions in Indonesia are now made public.
  • The PPATK now has extra investigative power and the ability to freeze bank accounts.
  • Financial institutions that violate AML standards risk having their licences revoked and having their shareholders included on a five-year blacklist.
  • Larger financial institutions and insurance businesses are subject to more stringent regulations.
  • PPATK and the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (AUSTRAC) now collaborate on a number of projects, such as audits of PPATK systems and training sessions for preventing money laundering and other financial crimes.

 

The FATF Status of Indonesia

Indonesia was removed from the FATF List of Countries that have been identified as having strategic AML deficiencies on 26 June 2015.

 

IMF’s View of AML Risk

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is contributing to the international fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism in several important ways, consistent with its core areas of competence. As a collaborative institution with near universal membership, the IMF is a natural forum for sharing information, developing common approaches to issues, and promoting desirable policies and standards -- all of which are critical in the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

In March 2022, they published a report that included key Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) recommendations for Indonesia, including integrating key money laundering or terrorist financing (ML/TF) risks in the priorities and operations of relevant agencies.

An earlier report published in January 2021, stated that as digitalisation accelerates in Indonesia during and post COVID-19, risks emerging prior to the pandemic are becoming even more relevant. Increased use of digital technology leads to increased vulnerability to data and privacy risks, loss of digital connectivity due to natural disasters, cyber-attacks, money laundering and terrorist financing, which may worsen if the use of digital means is scaled up in times of crisis.

 

Regulators and Legislators in Indonesia

Regulators

The Financial Services Responsibility of Indonesia, also known as Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK), and Bank Indonesia  (BI/ Central Bank of Indonesia), are in charge of creating AML legislation in Indonesia and have regulatory and oversight authority over all banks and financial institutions.

The OJK - Financial Services Authority of Indonesia is an Indonesian government agency which regulates and supervises the financial services sector. Its head office is in Jakarta. It was founded in 2011 as an independent, autonomous agency with a mandate to safeguard Indonesia's financial stability. As part of this responsibility, the OJK issues banking licences and keeps track of AML compliance.

PPATK - The Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center or INTRAC or PPATK is a government agency of Indonesia, responsible for financial intelligence. The agency is formed in 2002 to counter suspected money laundering and provide information on terrorist financing

 

Legislation in Indonesia

In addition, the Bank of Indonesia issued Regulation No. 14/27/PBI/2012 on implementation of Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Programmes for Commercial Banks as well as Regulation No 19/10/PBI/2017 regarding the adoption of an “Anti-Money Laundering and Prevention of Terrorism Financing for Non-Bank Payment System Service Provider and Non-Bank Currency Exchange Service” Procedure. Extensive regulations exist related to the application of know your customer (KYC) standards.

The main piece of anti-money laundering law in Indonesia is OJK Regulation No.12/POJK.01/2017 concerning the Implementation of the Anti-Money Laundering Programme and Terrorist Funding Prevention in the Financial Service Sector. The law mandates that institutions adopt a number of AML and CFT provisions that adhere to OJK and FATF norms.

 

Sanctions in Indonesia

There are no international sanctions currently in force against this country.

 

Penalties for Money Laundering in Indonesia

There are a number of potential penalties for breaking Indonesia's anti-money laundering laws, including fines of between IDR10 billion and IDR100 billion and prison sentences of up to 20 years.

 

AML Challenges in Indonesia

Indonesia remains vulnerable to money laundering due to gaps in financial system legislation and regulation, a cash-based economy, weak rule of law, and partially ineffective law enforcement institutions that lack coordination.

Along with drug trafficking and illicit logging, wildlife trafficking, theft, fraud, embezzlement, and the sale of fake goods are additional risks, as is the financing of terrorism, corruption, and tax evasion.

The banking, financial markets, real estate, and auto industries are used to launder criminal proceeds before they are transferred back home.

Improvements still need to be made in the areas of analytical training for law enforcement, increasing judicial authorities' knowledge of pertinent offences, improving technical capacity to conduct financial investigations as a regular part of criminal cases, and more training for those working in the financial services industry.  Additionally, the bank secrecy laws make it difficult for investigators and prosecutors to perform effective asset tracing because they need better access to complete banking records.

 

What Needs to be Done?

AML Requirements in Indonesia

The following measures from a government perspective can help reduce the country’s AML/CTF risk:

  • Strengthening of AML laws and regulations on par with international standards and adhering to the FATF risk-based approach
  • Assessing the capabilities of modern technologies such as machine learning and big data analytics in enhancing the effectiveness of AML compliance programmes and encouraging local FIs to use these technologies.

Banks and financial institutions in Indonesia respond to the challenges of money laundering they face by enhancing their anti-money laundering regulations and working toward the criteria outlined in the FATF's 40 Recommendations.

The FATF AML policy relies heavily on the risk-based approach, which involves determining the level of risk that particular clients and customers pose. Practically speaking, Indonesian AML compliance strategies must:

 

  • Customer Due Diligence (CDD): Implement appropriate customer due diligence measures in order to identify customers and clients. Enhanced due diligence measures are also necessary for high-risk customers.
  • Customer Identification and Screening: Screen customers against international sanctions list, adverse media, and politically exposed persons (PEP) lists.
  • An AML Programme and Officer: Appoint a dedicated AML compliance officer to oversee the internal AML programme.
  • Reporting of Suspicious Transactions: This FATF recommendation states that financial institutions should report suspicious transactions to the relevant financial intelligence unit (FIU) promptly.
  •  

 

How Tookitaki Can Help?

Innovations in tech have led to financial institutions - traditional as well as new-age ones such as digital banks, wallets, payment service providers, etc. - facing more complex financial crime challenges, particularly in the area of money laundering. Current siloed, rules-driven AML systems are not designed to keep pace with the growing business and compliance challenges that have emerged due to FinTech-led disruption in the space. These solutions struggle to:

  • Keep up to date with sophisticated money laundering techniques
  • Scale seamlessly to support real-time processing of huge transaction volumes
  • Adapt to recognise and account for fast-changing customer behaviour
  • Avoid ultra-high false positivesand piling up of huge alert backlogs
  • Provide a holistic risk view (from AML/CFT standpoint) for each customer along with their activity footprint
  • Keep up with the fragmented regulatory landscape and frequent amendments

To address these issues, Tookitaki developed the Anti-Money Laundering Suite (AMLS), an end-to-end AML operating system. The suite comprises Transaction Monitoring, Dynamic Customer Risk Review, Smart Screening (covering Customers as well as Payments) and Case Management solutions under one roof for all AML needs. Through Anti-Money Laundering Suite (AMLS), Tookitaki enables financial institutions to have comprehensive risk coverage in terms of AML insights out-of-the-box at all times.

This is made possible by Tookitaki’s game-changing approach to democratising AML insights, with the aid of an ecosystem of AML experts, through a privacy-protected federated learning framework. Tookitaki has enabled AML experts from all around the world to create and share the largest library of patterns of money laundering and financial crime behaviour, often called typologies. Tookitaki’s typology repository is a first-of-its-kind initiative allowing banks and financial institutions to join forces in the fight against financial crime.

Money laundering is based on a complex trail of financial transactions. Multiple complex rules are required to effectively monitor one pattern. Tookitaki has created a tool which allows firms to design rules based on real-life red flags. Instead of managing hundreds of rigid rules, AML officers can leverage fewer typologies which are easier to maintain and explain to regulators, whilst providing better risk coverage than static rules. Tookitaki’s Transaction Monitoring solution unlocks the power of typologies to detect hidden suspicious patterns and generates fewer alerts of higher quality.

Contact us today to learn how your business can benefit and strengthen your compliance efforts. Our team of experts are on hand to answer all your questions.

 

 

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Blogs
05 Jan 2026
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When Luck Isn’t Luck: Inside the Crown Casino Deception That Fooled the House

1. Introduction to the Scam

In October 2025, a luxury casino overlooking Sydney Harbour became the unlikely stage for one of Australia’s most unusual fraud cases of the year 2025.

There were no phishing links, fake investment platforms, or anonymous scam calls. Instead, the deception unfolded in plain sight across gaming tables, surveillance cameras, and whispered instructions delivered through hidden earpieces.

What initially appeared to be an extraordinary winning streak soon revealed something far more calculated. Over a series of gambling sessions, a visiting couple allegedly accumulated more than A$1.17 million in winnings at Crown Sydney. By late November, the pattern had raised enough concern for casino staff to alert authorities.

The couple were subsequently arrested and charged by New South Wales Police for allegedly dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage by deception.

This was not a random act of cheating.
It was an alleged technology-assisted, coordinated deception, executed with precision, speed, and behavioural discipline.

The case challenges a common assumption in financial crime. Fraud does not always originate online. Sometimes, it operates openly, exploiting trust in physical presence and gaps in behavioural monitoring.

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2. Anatomy of the Scam

Unlike digital payment fraud, this alleged scheme relied on physical execution, real-time coordination, and human decision-making, making it harder to detect in its early stages.

Step 1: Strategic Entry and Short-Term Targeting

The couple arrived in Sydney in October 2025 and began visiting the casino shortly after. Short-stay visitors with no local transaction history often present limited behavioural baselines, particularly in hospitality and gaming environments.

This lack of historical context created an ideal entry point.

Step 2: Use of Covert Recording Devices

Casino staff later identified suspicious equipment allegedly used during gameplay. Police reportedly seized:

  • A small concealed camera attached to clothing
  • A modified mobile phone with recording attachments
  • Custom-built mirrors and magnetised tools

These devices allegedly allowed the capture of live game information not normally accessible to players.

Step 3: Real-Time Remote Coordination

The couple allegedly wore concealed earpieces during play, suggesting live communication with external accomplices. This setup would have enabled:

  • Real-time interpretation of captured visuals
  • Calculation of betting advantages
  • Immediate signalling of wagering decisions

This was not instinct or chance.
It was alleged external intelligence delivered in real time.

Step 4: Repeated High-Value Wins

Across multiple sessions in October and November 2025, the couple reportedly amassed winnings exceeding A$1.17 million. The consistency and scale of success eventually triggered internal alerts within the casino’s surveillance and risk teams.

At this point, the pattern itself became the red flag.

Step 5: Detection and Arrest

Casino staff escalated their concerns to law enforcement. On 27 November 2025, NSW Police arrested the couple, executed search warrants at their accommodation, and seized equipment, cash, and personal items.

The alleged deception ended not because probability failed, but because behaviour stopped making sense.

3. Why This Scam Worked: The Psychology at Play

This case allegedly succeeded because it exploited human assumptions rather than technical weaknesses.

1. The Luck Bias

Casinos are built on probability. Exceptional winning streaks are rare, but not impossible. That uncertainty creates a narrow window where deception can hide behind chance.

2. Trust in Physical Presence

Face-to-face activity feels legitimate. A well-presented individual at a gaming table attracts less suspicion than an anonymous digital transaction.

3. Fragmented Oversight

Unlike banks, where fraud teams monitor end-to-end flows, casinos distribute responsibility across:

  • Dealers
  • Floor supervisors
  • Surveillance teams
  • Risk and compliance units

This fragmentation can delay pattern recognition.

4. Short-Duration Execution

The alleged activity unfolded over weeks, not years. Short-lived, high-impact schemes often evade traditional threshold-based monitoring.

4. The Financial Crime Lens Behind the Case

While this incident occurred in a gambling environment, the mechanics closely mirror broader financial crime typologies.

1. Information Asymmetry Exploitation

Covert devices allegedly created an unfair informational advantage, similar to insider abuse or privileged data misuse in financial markets.

2. Real-Time Decision Exploitation

Live coordination and immediate action resemble:

  • Authorised push payment fraud
  • Account takeover orchestration
  • Social engineering campaigns

Speed neutralised conventional controls.

3. Rapid Value Accumulation

Large gains over a compressed timeframe are classic precursors to:

  • Asset conversion
  • Laundering attempts
  • Cross-border fund movement

Had the activity continued, the next phase could have involved integration into the broader financial system.

ChatGPT Image Jan 5, 2026, 12_10_24 PM

5. Red Flags for Casinos, Banks, and Regulators

This case highlights behavioural signals that extend well beyond gaming floors.

A. Behavioural Red Flags

  • Highly consistent success rates across sessions
  • Near-perfect timing of decisions
  • Limited variance in betting behaviour

B. Operational Red Flags

  • Concealed devices or unusual attire
  • Repeated table changes followed by immediate wins
  • Non-verbal coordination during gameplay

C. Financial Red Flags

  • Sudden accumulation of high-value winnings
  • Requests for rapid payout or conversion
  • Intent to move value across borders shortly after gains

These indicators closely resemble red flags seen in mule networks and high-velocity fraud schemes.

6. How Tookitaki Strengthens Defences

This case reinforces why fraud prevention must move beyond channel-specific controls.

1. Scenario-Driven Intelligence from the AFC Ecosystem

Expert-contributed scenarios help institutions recognise patterns that fall outside traditional fraud categories, including:

  • Behavioural precision
  • Coordinated multi-actor execution
  • Short-duration, high-impact schemes

2. Behavioural Pattern Recognition

Tookitaki’s intelligence approach prioritises:

  • Probability-defying outcomes
  • Decision timing anomalies
  • Consistency where randomness should exist

These signals often surface risk before losses escalate.

3. Cross-Domain Fraud Thinking

The same intelligence principles used to detect:

  • Account takeovers
  • Payment scams
  • Mule networks

are equally applicable to non-traditional environments where value moves quickly.

Fraud is no longer confined to banks. Detection should not be either.

7. Conclusion

The Crown Sydney deception case is a reminder that modern fraud does not always arrive through screens, links, or malware.

Sometimes, it walks confidently through the front door.

This alleged scheme relied on behavioural discipline, real-time coordination, and technological advantage, all hidden behind the illusion of chance.

As fraud techniques continue to evolve, institutions must look beyond static rules and siloed monitoring. The future of fraud prevention lies in understanding behaviour, recognising improbable patterns, and sharing intelligence across ecosystems.

Because when luck stops looking like luck, the signal is already there.

When Luck Isn’t Luck: Inside the Crown Casino Deception That Fooled the House
Blogs
05 Jan 2026
6 min
read

Singapore’s Financial Shield: Choosing the Right AML Compliance Software Solutions

When trust is currency, AML compliance becomes your strongest asset.

In Singapore’s fast-evolving financial ecosystem, the battle against money laundering is intensifying. With MAS ramping up expectations and international regulators scrutinising cross-border flows, financial institutions must act decisively. Manual processes and outdated tools are no longer enough. What’s needed is a modern, intelligent, and adaptable approach—enter AML compliance software solutions.

This blog takes a close look at what makes a strong AML compliance software solution, the features to prioritise, and how Singapore’s institutions can future-proof their compliance programmes.

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Why AML Compliance Software Solutions Matter in Singapore

Singapore is a major financial hub, but that status also makes it a high-risk jurisdiction for complex money laundering techniques. From trade-based laundering and shell companies to cyber-enabled fraud, financial crime threats are becoming more global, fast-moving, and tech-driven.

According to the latest MAS Money Laundering Risk Assessment, sectors like banking and cross-border payments are under increasing pressure. Institutions need:

  • Real-time visibility into suspicious behaviour
  • Lower false positives
  • Faster reporting turnaround
  • Cost-effective compliance

The right AML software offers all of this—when chosen well.

What is AML Compliance Software?

AML compliance software refers to digital platforms designed to help financial institutions detect, investigate, report, and prevent financial crime in line with regulatory requirements. These systems combine rule-based logic, machine learning, and scenario-based monitoring to provide end-to-end compliance coverage.

Key use cases include:

Core Features to Look for in AML Compliance Software Solutions

Not all AML platforms are created equal. Here are the top features your solution must have:

1. Real-Time Transaction Monitoring

The ability to flag suspicious activities as they happen—especially critical in high-risk verticals such as remittance, retail banking, and digital assets.

2. Risk-Based Approach

Modern systems allow for dynamic risk scoring based on customer behaviour, transaction patterns, and geographical exposure. This enables prioritised investigations.

3. AI and Machine Learning Models

Look for adaptive learning capabilities that improve accuracy over time, helping to reduce false positives and uncover previously unseen threats.

4. Integrated Screening Engine

Your system should seamlessly screen customers and transactions against global sanctions lists, PEPs, and adverse media sources.

5. End-to-End Case Management

From alert generation to case disposition and reporting, the platform should provide a unified workflow that helps analysts move faster.

6. Regulatory Alignment

Built-in compliance with local MAS guidelines (such as PSN02, AML Notices, and STR filing requirements) is essential for institutions in Singapore.

7. Explainability and Auditability

Tools that provide clear reasoning behind alerts and decisions can ensure internal transparency and regulatory acceptance.

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Common Challenges in AML Compliance

Singaporean financial institutions often face the following hurdles:

  • High false positive rates
  • Fragmented data systems across business lines
  • Manual case reviews slowing down investigations
  • Delayed or inaccurate regulatory reports
  • Difficulty adjusting to new typologies or scams

These challenges aren’t just operational—they can lead to regulatory penalties, reputational damage, and lost customer trust. AML software solutions address these pain points by introducing automation, intelligence, and scalability.

How Tookitaki’s FinCense Delivers End-to-End AML Compliance

Tookitaki’s FinCense platform is purpose-built to solve compliance pain points faced by financial institutions across Singapore and the broader APAC region.

Key Benefits:

  • Out-of-the-box scenarios from the AFC Ecosystem that adapt to new risk patterns
  • Federated learning to improve model accuracy across institutions without compromising data privacy
  • Smart Disposition Engine for automated case narration, regulatory reporting, and audit readiness
  • Real-time monitoring with adaptive risk scoring and alert prioritisation

With FinCense, institutions have reported:

  • 72% reduction in false positives
  • 3.5x increase in analyst efficiency
  • Greater regulator confidence due to better audit trails

FinCense isn’t just software—it’s a trust layer for modern financial crime prevention.

Best Practices for Evaluating AML Compliance Software

Before investing, financial institutions should ask:

  1. Does the software scale with your future growth and risk exposure?
  2. Can it localise to Singapore’s regulatory and typology landscape?
  3. Is the AI explainable, and is the platform auditable?
  4. Can it ingest external intelligence and industry scenarios?
  5. How quickly can you update detection rules based on new threats?

Singapore’s Regulatory Expectations

The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has emphasised risk-based, tech-enabled compliance in its guidance. Recent thematic reviews and enforcement actions have highlighted the importance of:

  • Timely Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STRs)
  • Strong detection of mule accounts and digital fraud patterns
  • Collaboration with industry peers to address cross-institution threats

AML software is no longer just about ticking boxes—it must show effectiveness, agility, and accountability.

Conclusion: Future-Ready Compliance Begins with the Right Tools

Singapore’s compliance landscape is becoming more complex, more real-time, and more collaborative. The right AML software helps financial institutions stay one step ahead—not just of regulators, but of financial criminals.

From screening to reporting, from risk scoring to AI-powered decisioning, AML compliance software solutions are no longer optional. They are mission-critical.

Choose wisely, and you don’t just meet compliance—you build competitive trust.

Singapore’s Financial Shield: Choosing the Right AML Compliance Software Solutions
Blogs
23 Dec 2025
6 min
read

AML Failures Are Now Capital Risks: The Bendigo Case Proves It

When Australian regulators translate AML failures into capital penalties, it signals more than enforcement. It signals a fundamental shift in how financial crime risk is priced, governed, and punished.

The recent action against Bendigo and Adelaide Bank marks a decisive turning point in Australia’s regulatory posture. Weak anti-money laundering controls are no longer viewed as back-office compliance shortcomings. They are now being treated as prudential risks with direct balance-sheet consequences.

This is not just another enforcement headline. It is a clear warning to the entire financial sector.

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What happened at Bendigo Bank

Following an independent review, regulators identified significant and persistent deficiencies in Bendigo Bank’s financial crime control framework. What stood out was not only the severity of the gaps, but their duration.

Key weaknesses remained unresolved for more than six years, spanning from 2019 to 2025. These were not confined to a single branch, product, or customer segment. They were assessed as systemic, affecting governance, oversight, and the effectiveness of AML controls across the institution.

In response, regulators acted in coordination:

The framing matters. This was not positioned as punishment for an isolated incident. Regulators explicitly pointed to long-standing control failures and prolonged exposure to financial crime risk.

Why this is not just another AML penalty

This case stands apart from past enforcement actions for one critical reason.

Capital was used as the lever.

A capital add-on is fundamentally different from a fine or enforceable undertaking. By requiring additional capital to be held, APRA is signalling that deficiencies in financial crime controls materially increase an institution’s operational risk profile.

Until those risks are demonstrably addressed, they must be absorbed on the balance sheet.

The consequences are tangible:

  • Reduced capital flexibility
  • Pressure on return on equity
  • Constraints on growth and strategic initiatives
  • Prolonged supervisory scrutiny

The underlying message is unambiguous.
AML weaknesses now come with a measurable capital cost.

AML failures are now viewed as prudential risk

This case also signals a shift in how regulators define the problem.

The findings were not limited to missed alerts or procedural non-compliance. Regulators highlighted broader, structural weaknesses, including:

  • Ineffective transaction monitoring
  • Inadequate customer risk assessment and limited beneficial ownership visibility
  • Weak escalation from branch-level operations
  • Fragmented oversight between frontline teams and central compliance
  • Governance gaps that allowed weaknesses to persist undetected

These are not execution errors.
They are risk management failures.

This explains the joint involvement of APRA and AUSTRAC. Financial crime controls are now firmly embedded within expectations around enterprise risk management, institutional resilience, and safety and soundness.

Six years of exposure is a governance failure

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Bendigo case is duration.

When material AML weaknesses persist across multiple years, audit cycles, and regulatory engagements, the issue is no longer technology alone. It becomes a question of:

  • Risk culture
  • Accountability
  • Board oversight
  • Management prioritisation

Australian regulators have made it increasingly clear that financial crime risk cannot be fully delegated to second-line functions. Boards and senior executives are expected to understand AML risk in operational and strategic terms, not just policy language.

This reflects a broader global trend. Prolonged AML failures are now widely treated as indicators of governance weakness, not just compliance gaps.

Why joint APRA–AUSTRAC action matters

The coordinated response itself is a signal.

APRA’s mandate centres on institutional stability and resilience. AUSTRAC’s mandate focuses on financial intelligence and the disruption of serious and organised crime. When both regulators act together, it reflects a shared conclusion: financial crime control failures have crossed into systemic risk territory.

This convergence is becoming increasingly common internationally. Regulators are no longer willing to separate AML compliance from prudential supervision when weaknesses are persistent, enterprise-wide, and inadequately addressed.

For Australian institutions, this means AML maturity is now inseparable from broader risk and capital considerations.

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The hidden cost of delayed remediation

The Bendigo case also exposes an uncomfortable truth.

Delayed remediation is expensive.

When control weaknesses are allowed to persist, institutions often face:

  • Large-scale, multi-year transformation programs
  • Significant technology modernisation costs
  • Extensive retraining and cultural change initiatives
  • Capital locked up until regulators are satisfied
  • Sustained supervisory and reputational pressure

What could have been incremental improvements years earlier can escalate into a full institutional overhaul when left unresolved.

In this context, capital add-ons act not just as penalties, but as forcing mechanisms to ensure sustained executive and board-level focus.

What this means for Australian banks and fintechs

This case should prompt serious reflection across the sector.

Several lessons are already clear:

  • Static, rules-based monitoring struggles to keep pace with evolving typologies
  • Siloed fraud and AML functions miss cross-channel risk patterns
  • Documented controls are insufficient if they are not effective in practice
  • Regulators are increasingly focused on outcomes, not frameworks

Importantly, this applies beyond major banks. Regional institutions, mutuals, and digitally expanding fintechs are firmly within scope. Scale is no longer a mitigating factor.

Where technology must step in before capital is at risk

Cases like Bendigo expose a widening gap between regulatory expectations and how financial crime controls are still implemented in many institutions. Legacy systems, fragmented monitoring, and periodic reviews are increasingly misaligned with the realities of modern financial crime.

At Tookitaki, financial crime prevention is approached as a continuous intelligence challenge, rather than a static compliance obligation. The emphasis is on adaptability, explainability, and real-time risk visibility, enabling institutions to surface emerging threats before they escalate into supervisory or capital issues.

By combining real-time transaction monitoring with collaborative, scenario-driven intelligence, institutions can reduce blind spots and demonstrate sustained control effectiveness. In an environment where regulators are increasingly focused on whether controls actually work, this ability is becoming central to maintaining regulatory confidence.

Many of the weaknesses highlighted in this case mirror patterns seen across recent regulatory reviews. Institutions that address them early are far better positioned to avoid capital shocks later.

From compliance posture to risk ownership

The clearest takeaway from the Bendigo case is the need for a mindset shift.

Financial crime risk can no longer be treated as a downstream compliance concern. It must be owned as a core institutional risk, alongside credit, liquidity, and operational resilience.

Institutions that proactively modernise their AML capabilities and strengthen governance will be better placed to avoid prolonged remediation, capital constraints, and reputational damage.

A turning point for trust and resilience

The action against Bendigo Bank is not about one institution. It reflects a broader regulatory recalibration.

AML failures are now capital risks.

In Australia’s evolving regulatory landscape, AML is no longer a cost of doing business.
It is a measure of institutional resilience, governance strength, and trustworthiness.

Those that adapt early will navigate this shift with confidence. Those that do not may find that the cost of getting AML wrong is far higher than expected.

AML Failures Are Now Capital Risks: The Bendigo Case Proves It