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Sharing information between institutions helps detect money laundering

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Tookitaki
30 July 2021
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6 min

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) says institutions should be sharing information between them to detect money laundering more easily and comply with the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Countering the Financial of Terrorism (CFT) requirements.

Money laundering is a global problem with an estimated size of up to US$2 trillion (5% of the global gross domestic product) being illegally laundered each year.

While regulators and financial institutions across the world have been working hard to curb this socio-economic corruption, with ever-increasing cooperation and stricter scrutiny, their efforts have largely been ineffective.

Curbing financial crime has been daunting as multinational criminal schemes cannot be tackled by one jurisdiction alone. Furthermore, criminals exploit more than one institution to launder, move or use funds with links to terrorism.

In this context, global money-laundering watchdog Financial Action Task Force (FATF) says that “data sharing is critical to fight money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation”.

In its recent report titled Stocktake on data pooling, collaborative analytics and data protection, the international agency provides the FATF recommendations. It notes that with technological advances, financial institutions can analyse large amounts of structured and unstructured data and identify patterns and trends more effectively. The report also lists available and emerging technologies that facilitate advanced AML/CFT analytics and allow collaborative analytics between financial institutions while respecting national and international data privacy requirements.

The need for data pooling and collaborative analytics

According to the FATF, data sharing is important to fight money laundering today. The key points shared by the FATF on this are:

  • Data about individual customers is becoming “increasingly dispersed” across different financial institutions as customers are using multiple banking institutions. Therefore, a sole institution going after a criminal might not be effective.
  • Sharing data and using advanced analytics simultaneously by multiple financial institutions can reveal trends or potentially suspicious activities more effectively.
  • Data sharing can aid financial institutions with transaction monitoring, institutional risk assessment, customer onboarding and identification of the beneficial owner.
  • It can help prevent criminals who engage with multiple domestic and international financial institutions from exploiting information gaps.
  • It can also help identify and share patterns, such as the typologies of crime that can effectively help institutions detect crimes and conduct intelligence-driven investigations.

The types of data that could be shared

Based on a survey of AML/CFT national authorities, financial institutions, technology developers, academia and other private sector representatives, the FATF noted that many types of data could be encrypted for AML/CFT purposes. They include Customer Due Diligence (CDD) information, transactions, red flags, indications of customer risk (such as whether a Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) has been filed) and updated information of the institutions in a correspondent banking relationship.

Respondents added that a combination of data categories is often shared, depending on the specific objectives. Some respondents also noted that the sharing of customer information is only occurring in an encrypted state and on the occasion that the concept is unclear.

In addition to the above-mentioned types, respondents also stated that they share “Other” types of data such as legal entity identifier reference data, typologies and alert dispositioning/outcomes (for internal model tuning).

How data is currently shared

The FATF noted that it had identified various new technologies under development or in use to facilitate data sharing and analysis between financial institutions for AML/CFT purposes, as part of its research and interviews with respondents. The identified technologies and their sub-items are listed below:

Cryptography/Encryption Technologies

  • Homomorphic encryption enables access to a wider set of data to improve outcomes and enable intelligence-led decision making.
  • Zero-knowledge proofs allow one bank to gain another bank’s data that they hold on an individual, without sharing that individual’s identity.
  • Secure-multiparty computation when applied to different data sources, they can extract credible suspicions from different parties, while keeping the data sovereign.
  • Differential Privacy can analyse broad trends, but may create a trade-off between precision of data and privacy.

Advanced Analytics

  • Machine Learning can optimise decision points in business processes by understanding the current states and predicting optimal decisions. A scoring model or classification mode can help identify suspicious networks or entities.
  • Federated Learning such as a travelling algorithm, can access and interrogate data sets in different financial institutions without moving the data. This leads to more dynamic risk assessment tools.
  • Deep Learning can help financial institutions monitor transactions.
  • Natural Language Processing can transform free text in suspicious transaction reports into structured data that can be used for network analytics.
  • Robotic Process Automation enhances efficiency by automating repetitive tasks that were previously performed by humans.
  • Network Analytics derives patterns that cannot otherwise be seen at end-point level. It can identify a network of related entities based on known subject(s) of interest.

Infrastructures for Processing and Transfer

  • Trusted execution environments (confidential computing) enable two parties to agree to share their data (e.g., transaction data) and analyse it using a trusted execution environment.
  • Secure cloud technology enables firms to collect, store, and analyse significantly large data sets at very low costs, of both structured and unstructured data, that can help collaboration amongst those with access to the secure cloud environment. However, legal barriers for data sharing remain the same.
  • Distributed Ledger Technology can be used to share data between several parties, without one party having the full power of data disposal.
  • Application programming interfaces (API) allows large data sets to be collected, stored and analysed more efficiently.

The FATF, however, noted that an open dialogue between financial institutions AML/CFT supervisors and data privacy protection authorities is important to the success of initiatives using new technologies and their ultimate effective implementation. In addition, regulatory sandboxes (or innovation hubs) provide valuable opportunities to test how new technologies interact with national (or supranational) AML/CFT and DPP laws and regulations. Other challenges involved in the use of these technologies include:

  • The perceived conflict between a financial institution’s desire to share information and more efficiently comply with AML/CFT measures, and existing legal restrictions designed to protect the privacy of its customers.
  • Low quality data, including inaccurate or out-of-date data that could nullify the benefits of data pooling and result in an incorrect analytical outcome, including biased conclusions.
  • The lack of regulatory clarity in the form of explicit regulatory requirements and guidance for the use of new technology.
  • The explainability and interpretability of a decision based on a high level of automation.

 

Tookitaki and Federated Learning

A regulatory technology company focused on AML, Tookitaki has developed a Federated Learning-enabled AML information sharing framework, called the AML Ecosystem. Tookitaki has created an ecosystem of AML Knowledge through the Typology Repository (Hub) while breaking down silos through the AML Detection Engine (Spokes). Insights from the Hub can be seamlessly consumed through the Spokes by financial institutions to identify and prevent financial crime.

Typology Repository is a fast-growing database of AML typologies or scenarios sourced from a network of AML experts globally, including financial institutions, law enforcement and regulators, and non-profit organisations. Typologies refer to patterns that are used to finance or launder money for illicit activities like drug trafficking, forced labour, forgery, terrorism, etc. They map varied customer activities that represent suspicious behaviour without using any Personally Identifiable Information (PII).

Tookitaki Typology Repository is pre-packaged with Typology Developer Studio that allows the creation of typologies holistically through a No-Code user interface. Once created and verified, typologies can be downloaded by user institutions. Tookitaki AML engine – AMLS uses a proprietary AML insights language to deconstruct the typologies consumed from Typology Repository into risk indicators and then generate automated thresholds based on customer risk levels. Finally, an inbuilt simulation engine validates typologies while using a maker-checker process to deploy them seamlessly.

The AML Ecosystem enhances our machine learning-based transaction monitoring solution with superior detection capabilities. It is helping banks and fintech firms with financial crime identification and prevention by democratising AML insights through privacy-protected federated learning and precise detection through a hyper configurable machine learning approach.

For more information on our AML Ecosystem and the ways in which it supercharges your transaction monitoring capabilities, please contact us.

 

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Blogs
05 Jan 2026
6 min
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When Luck Isn’t Luck: Inside the Crown Casino Deception That Fooled the House

1. Introduction to the Scam

In October 2025, a luxury casino overlooking Sydney Harbour became the unlikely stage for one of Australia’s most unusual fraud cases of the year 2025.

There were no phishing links, fake investment platforms, or anonymous scam calls. Instead, the deception unfolded in plain sight across gaming tables, surveillance cameras, and whispered instructions delivered through hidden earpieces.

What initially appeared to be an extraordinary winning streak soon revealed something far more calculated. Over a series of gambling sessions, a visiting couple allegedly accumulated more than A$1.17 million in winnings at Crown Sydney. By late November, the pattern had raised enough concern for casino staff to alert authorities.

The couple were subsequently arrested and charged by New South Wales Police for allegedly dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage by deception.

This was not a random act of cheating.
It was an alleged technology-assisted, coordinated deception, executed with precision, speed, and behavioural discipline.

The case challenges a common assumption in financial crime. Fraud does not always originate online. Sometimes, it operates openly, exploiting trust in physical presence and gaps in behavioural monitoring.

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2. Anatomy of the Scam

Unlike digital payment fraud, this alleged scheme relied on physical execution, real-time coordination, and human decision-making, making it harder to detect in its early stages.

Step 1: Strategic Entry and Short-Term Targeting

The couple arrived in Sydney in October 2025 and began visiting the casino shortly after. Short-stay visitors with no local transaction history often present limited behavioural baselines, particularly in hospitality and gaming environments.

This lack of historical context created an ideal entry point.

Step 2: Use of Covert Recording Devices

Casino staff later identified suspicious equipment allegedly used during gameplay. Police reportedly seized:

  • A small concealed camera attached to clothing
  • A modified mobile phone with recording attachments
  • Custom-built mirrors and magnetised tools

These devices allegedly allowed the capture of live game information not normally accessible to players.

Step 3: Real-Time Remote Coordination

The couple allegedly wore concealed earpieces during play, suggesting live communication with external accomplices. This setup would have enabled:

  • Real-time interpretation of captured visuals
  • Calculation of betting advantages
  • Immediate signalling of wagering decisions

This was not instinct or chance.
It was alleged external intelligence delivered in real time.

Step 4: Repeated High-Value Wins

Across multiple sessions in October and November 2025, the couple reportedly amassed winnings exceeding A$1.17 million. The consistency and scale of success eventually triggered internal alerts within the casino’s surveillance and risk teams.

At this point, the pattern itself became the red flag.

Step 5: Detection and Arrest

Casino staff escalated their concerns to law enforcement. On 27 November 2025, NSW Police arrested the couple, executed search warrants at their accommodation, and seized equipment, cash, and personal items.

The alleged deception ended not because probability failed, but because behaviour stopped making sense.

3. Why This Scam Worked: The Psychology at Play

This case allegedly succeeded because it exploited human assumptions rather than technical weaknesses.

1. The Luck Bias

Casinos are built on probability. Exceptional winning streaks are rare, but not impossible. That uncertainty creates a narrow window where deception can hide behind chance.

2. Trust in Physical Presence

Face-to-face activity feels legitimate. A well-presented individual at a gaming table attracts less suspicion than an anonymous digital transaction.

3. Fragmented Oversight

Unlike banks, where fraud teams monitor end-to-end flows, casinos distribute responsibility across:

  • Dealers
  • Floor supervisors
  • Surveillance teams
  • Risk and compliance units

This fragmentation can delay pattern recognition.

4. Short-Duration Execution

The alleged activity unfolded over weeks, not years. Short-lived, high-impact schemes often evade traditional threshold-based monitoring.

4. The Financial Crime Lens Behind the Case

While this incident occurred in a gambling environment, the mechanics closely mirror broader financial crime typologies.

1. Information Asymmetry Exploitation

Covert devices allegedly created an unfair informational advantage, similar to insider abuse or privileged data misuse in financial markets.

2. Real-Time Decision Exploitation

Live coordination and immediate action resemble:

  • Authorised push payment fraud
  • Account takeover orchestration
  • Social engineering campaigns

Speed neutralised conventional controls.

3. Rapid Value Accumulation

Large gains over a compressed timeframe are classic precursors to:

  • Asset conversion
  • Laundering attempts
  • Cross-border fund movement

Had the activity continued, the next phase could have involved integration into the broader financial system.

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5. Red Flags for Casinos, Banks, and Regulators

This case highlights behavioural signals that extend well beyond gaming floors.

A. Behavioural Red Flags

  • Highly consistent success rates across sessions
  • Near-perfect timing of decisions
  • Limited variance in betting behaviour

B. Operational Red Flags

  • Concealed devices or unusual attire
  • Repeated table changes followed by immediate wins
  • Non-verbal coordination during gameplay

C. Financial Red Flags

  • Sudden accumulation of high-value winnings
  • Requests for rapid payout or conversion
  • Intent to move value across borders shortly after gains

These indicators closely resemble red flags seen in mule networks and high-velocity fraud schemes.

6. How Tookitaki Strengthens Defences

This case reinforces why fraud prevention must move beyond channel-specific controls.

1. Scenario-Driven Intelligence from the AFC Ecosystem

Expert-contributed scenarios help institutions recognise patterns that fall outside traditional fraud categories, including:

  • Behavioural precision
  • Coordinated multi-actor execution
  • Short-duration, high-impact schemes

2. Behavioural Pattern Recognition

Tookitaki’s intelligence approach prioritises:

  • Probability-defying outcomes
  • Decision timing anomalies
  • Consistency where randomness should exist

These signals often surface risk before losses escalate.

3. Cross-Domain Fraud Thinking

The same intelligence principles used to detect:

  • Account takeovers
  • Payment scams
  • Mule networks

are equally applicable to non-traditional environments where value moves quickly.

Fraud is no longer confined to banks. Detection should not be either.

7. Conclusion

The Crown Sydney deception case is a reminder that modern fraud does not always arrive through screens, links, or malware.

Sometimes, it walks confidently through the front door.

This alleged scheme relied on behavioural discipline, real-time coordination, and technological advantage, all hidden behind the illusion of chance.

As fraud techniques continue to evolve, institutions must look beyond static rules and siloed monitoring. The future of fraud prevention lies in understanding behaviour, recognising improbable patterns, and sharing intelligence across ecosystems.

Because when luck stops looking like luck, the signal is already there.

When Luck Isn’t Luck: Inside the Crown Casino Deception That Fooled the House
Blogs
05 Jan 2026
6 min
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Singapore’s Financial Shield: Choosing the Right AML Compliance Software Solutions

When trust is currency, AML compliance becomes your strongest asset.

In Singapore’s fast-evolving financial ecosystem, the battle against money laundering is intensifying. With MAS ramping up expectations and international regulators scrutinising cross-border flows, financial institutions must act decisively. Manual processes and outdated tools are no longer enough. What’s needed is a modern, intelligent, and adaptable approach—enter AML compliance software solutions.

This blog takes a close look at what makes a strong AML compliance software solution, the features to prioritise, and how Singapore’s institutions can future-proof their compliance programmes.

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Why AML Compliance Software Solutions Matter in Singapore

Singapore is a major financial hub, but that status also makes it a high-risk jurisdiction for complex money laundering techniques. From trade-based laundering and shell companies to cyber-enabled fraud, financial crime threats are becoming more global, fast-moving, and tech-driven.

According to the latest MAS Money Laundering Risk Assessment, sectors like banking and cross-border payments are under increasing pressure. Institutions need:

  • Real-time visibility into suspicious behaviour
  • Lower false positives
  • Faster reporting turnaround
  • Cost-effective compliance

The right AML software offers all of this—when chosen well.

What is AML Compliance Software?

AML compliance software refers to digital platforms designed to help financial institutions detect, investigate, report, and prevent financial crime in line with regulatory requirements. These systems combine rule-based logic, machine learning, and scenario-based monitoring to provide end-to-end compliance coverage.

Key use cases include:

Core Features to Look for in AML Compliance Software Solutions

Not all AML platforms are created equal. Here are the top features your solution must have:

1. Real-Time Transaction Monitoring

The ability to flag suspicious activities as they happen—especially critical in high-risk verticals such as remittance, retail banking, and digital assets.

2. Risk-Based Approach

Modern systems allow for dynamic risk scoring based on customer behaviour, transaction patterns, and geographical exposure. This enables prioritised investigations.

3. AI and Machine Learning Models

Look for adaptive learning capabilities that improve accuracy over time, helping to reduce false positives and uncover previously unseen threats.

4. Integrated Screening Engine

Your system should seamlessly screen customers and transactions against global sanctions lists, PEPs, and adverse media sources.

5. End-to-End Case Management

From alert generation to case disposition and reporting, the platform should provide a unified workflow that helps analysts move faster.

6. Regulatory Alignment

Built-in compliance with local MAS guidelines (such as PSN02, AML Notices, and STR filing requirements) is essential for institutions in Singapore.

7. Explainability and Auditability

Tools that provide clear reasoning behind alerts and decisions can ensure internal transparency and regulatory acceptance.

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Common Challenges in AML Compliance

Singaporean financial institutions often face the following hurdles:

  • High false positive rates
  • Fragmented data systems across business lines
  • Manual case reviews slowing down investigations
  • Delayed or inaccurate regulatory reports
  • Difficulty adjusting to new typologies or scams

These challenges aren’t just operational—they can lead to regulatory penalties, reputational damage, and lost customer trust. AML software solutions address these pain points by introducing automation, intelligence, and scalability.

How Tookitaki’s FinCense Delivers End-to-End AML Compliance

Tookitaki’s FinCense platform is purpose-built to solve compliance pain points faced by financial institutions across Singapore and the broader APAC region.

Key Benefits:

  • Out-of-the-box scenarios from the AFC Ecosystem that adapt to new risk patterns
  • Federated learning to improve model accuracy across institutions without compromising data privacy
  • Smart Disposition Engine for automated case narration, regulatory reporting, and audit readiness
  • Real-time monitoring with adaptive risk scoring and alert prioritisation

With FinCense, institutions have reported:

  • 72% reduction in false positives
  • 3.5x increase in analyst efficiency
  • Greater regulator confidence due to better audit trails

FinCense isn’t just software—it’s a trust layer for modern financial crime prevention.

Best Practices for Evaluating AML Compliance Software

Before investing, financial institutions should ask:

  1. Does the software scale with your future growth and risk exposure?
  2. Can it localise to Singapore’s regulatory and typology landscape?
  3. Is the AI explainable, and is the platform auditable?
  4. Can it ingest external intelligence and industry scenarios?
  5. How quickly can you update detection rules based on new threats?

Singapore’s Regulatory Expectations

The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has emphasised risk-based, tech-enabled compliance in its guidance. Recent thematic reviews and enforcement actions have highlighted the importance of:

  • Timely Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STRs)
  • Strong detection of mule accounts and digital fraud patterns
  • Collaboration with industry peers to address cross-institution threats

AML software is no longer just about ticking boxes—it must show effectiveness, agility, and accountability.

Conclusion: Future-Ready Compliance Begins with the Right Tools

Singapore’s compliance landscape is becoming more complex, more real-time, and more collaborative. The right AML software helps financial institutions stay one step ahead—not just of regulators, but of financial criminals.

From screening to reporting, from risk scoring to AI-powered decisioning, AML compliance software solutions are no longer optional. They are mission-critical.

Choose wisely, and you don’t just meet compliance—you build competitive trust.

Singapore’s Financial Shield: Choosing the Right AML Compliance Software Solutions
Blogs
23 Dec 2025
6 min
read

AML Failures Are Now Capital Risks: The Bendigo Case Proves It

When Australian regulators translate AML failures into capital penalties, it signals more than enforcement. It signals a fundamental shift in how financial crime risk is priced, governed, and punished.

The recent action against Bendigo and Adelaide Bank marks a decisive turning point in Australia’s regulatory posture. Weak anti-money laundering controls are no longer viewed as back-office compliance shortcomings. They are now being treated as prudential risks with direct balance-sheet consequences.

This is not just another enforcement headline. It is a clear warning to the entire financial sector.

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What happened at Bendigo Bank

Following an independent review, regulators identified significant and persistent deficiencies in Bendigo Bank’s financial crime control framework. What stood out was not only the severity of the gaps, but their duration.

Key weaknesses remained unresolved for more than six years, spanning from 2019 to 2025. These were not confined to a single branch, product, or customer segment. They were assessed as systemic, affecting governance, oversight, and the effectiveness of AML controls across the institution.

In response, regulators acted in coordination:

The framing matters. This was not positioned as punishment for an isolated incident. Regulators explicitly pointed to long-standing control failures and prolonged exposure to financial crime risk.

Why this is not just another AML penalty

This case stands apart from past enforcement actions for one critical reason.

Capital was used as the lever.

A capital add-on is fundamentally different from a fine or enforceable undertaking. By requiring additional capital to be held, APRA is signalling that deficiencies in financial crime controls materially increase an institution’s operational risk profile.

Until those risks are demonstrably addressed, they must be absorbed on the balance sheet.

The consequences are tangible:

  • Reduced capital flexibility
  • Pressure on return on equity
  • Constraints on growth and strategic initiatives
  • Prolonged supervisory scrutiny

The underlying message is unambiguous.
AML weaknesses now come with a measurable capital cost.

AML failures are now viewed as prudential risk

This case also signals a shift in how regulators define the problem.

The findings were not limited to missed alerts or procedural non-compliance. Regulators highlighted broader, structural weaknesses, including:

  • Ineffective transaction monitoring
  • Inadequate customer risk assessment and limited beneficial ownership visibility
  • Weak escalation from branch-level operations
  • Fragmented oversight between frontline teams and central compliance
  • Governance gaps that allowed weaknesses to persist undetected

These are not execution errors.
They are risk management failures.

This explains the joint involvement of APRA and AUSTRAC. Financial crime controls are now firmly embedded within expectations around enterprise risk management, institutional resilience, and safety and soundness.

Six years of exposure is a governance failure

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Bendigo case is duration.

When material AML weaknesses persist across multiple years, audit cycles, and regulatory engagements, the issue is no longer technology alone. It becomes a question of:

  • Risk culture
  • Accountability
  • Board oversight
  • Management prioritisation

Australian regulators have made it increasingly clear that financial crime risk cannot be fully delegated to second-line functions. Boards and senior executives are expected to understand AML risk in operational and strategic terms, not just policy language.

This reflects a broader global trend. Prolonged AML failures are now widely treated as indicators of governance weakness, not just compliance gaps.

Why joint APRA–AUSTRAC action matters

The coordinated response itself is a signal.

APRA’s mandate centres on institutional stability and resilience. AUSTRAC’s mandate focuses on financial intelligence and the disruption of serious and organised crime. When both regulators act together, it reflects a shared conclusion: financial crime control failures have crossed into systemic risk territory.

This convergence is becoming increasingly common internationally. Regulators are no longer willing to separate AML compliance from prudential supervision when weaknesses are persistent, enterprise-wide, and inadequately addressed.

For Australian institutions, this means AML maturity is now inseparable from broader risk and capital considerations.

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The hidden cost of delayed remediation

The Bendigo case also exposes an uncomfortable truth.

Delayed remediation is expensive.

When control weaknesses are allowed to persist, institutions often face:

  • Large-scale, multi-year transformation programs
  • Significant technology modernisation costs
  • Extensive retraining and cultural change initiatives
  • Capital locked up until regulators are satisfied
  • Sustained supervisory and reputational pressure

What could have been incremental improvements years earlier can escalate into a full institutional overhaul when left unresolved.

In this context, capital add-ons act not just as penalties, but as forcing mechanisms to ensure sustained executive and board-level focus.

What this means for Australian banks and fintechs

This case should prompt serious reflection across the sector.

Several lessons are already clear:

  • Static, rules-based monitoring struggles to keep pace with evolving typologies
  • Siloed fraud and AML functions miss cross-channel risk patterns
  • Documented controls are insufficient if they are not effective in practice
  • Regulators are increasingly focused on outcomes, not frameworks

Importantly, this applies beyond major banks. Regional institutions, mutuals, and digitally expanding fintechs are firmly within scope. Scale is no longer a mitigating factor.

Where technology must step in before capital is at risk

Cases like Bendigo expose a widening gap between regulatory expectations and how financial crime controls are still implemented in many institutions. Legacy systems, fragmented monitoring, and periodic reviews are increasingly misaligned with the realities of modern financial crime.

At Tookitaki, financial crime prevention is approached as a continuous intelligence challenge, rather than a static compliance obligation. The emphasis is on adaptability, explainability, and real-time risk visibility, enabling institutions to surface emerging threats before they escalate into supervisory or capital issues.

By combining real-time transaction monitoring with collaborative, scenario-driven intelligence, institutions can reduce blind spots and demonstrate sustained control effectiveness. In an environment where regulators are increasingly focused on whether controls actually work, this ability is becoming central to maintaining regulatory confidence.

Many of the weaknesses highlighted in this case mirror patterns seen across recent regulatory reviews. Institutions that address them early are far better positioned to avoid capital shocks later.

From compliance posture to risk ownership

The clearest takeaway from the Bendigo case is the need for a mindset shift.

Financial crime risk can no longer be treated as a downstream compliance concern. It must be owned as a core institutional risk, alongside credit, liquidity, and operational resilience.

Institutions that proactively modernise their AML capabilities and strengthen governance will be better placed to avoid prolonged remediation, capital constraints, and reputational damage.

A turning point for trust and resilience

The action against Bendigo Bank is not about one institution. It reflects a broader regulatory recalibration.

AML failures are now capital risks.

In Australia’s evolving regulatory landscape, AML is no longer a cost of doing business.
It is a measure of institutional resilience, governance strength, and trustworthiness.

Those that adapt early will navigate this shift with confidence. Those that do not may find that the cost of getting AML wrong is far higher than expected.

AML Failures Are Now Capital Risks: The Bendigo Case Proves It