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Money Laundering via Cryptocurrencies: All You Need to Know

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Tookitaki
04 November 2020
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8 min

Money laundering via cryptocurrency has been going on for a while now. We’ve all heard of Bitcoin, Ethereum and Dogecoin. Crypto is used by financial criminals globally but how are they getting away with it? It’s time we lifted the lid on this crime and decoded what often sounds complicated but doesn’t have to be.

This is everything you need to know. 

What is cryptocurrency?

Simply put, Cryptocurrency is a digital or virtual currency that is protected by encryption, making counterfeiting and double-spending practically impossible. Many cryptocurrencies are built on blockchain technology, which is a distributed ledger enforced by a distributed network of computers. Cryptocurrencies are distinguished by the fact that they are not issued by any central authority, making them potentially resistant to government intervention or manipulation.

The biggest criticism Cryptocurrencies face is their use for illegal activities.

Technological advancements have given criminals faster and safer options to wash their ill-gotten money. There is no doubt that cryptocurrencies are a very useful technological innovation that helps individuals and institutions access financial products and services in a faster and cost-effective manner. However, their rise as alternative value transfer and investment tools raises money laundering concerns as well.

Banned in some countries

Cryptocurrencies are rapidly gaining popularity, but not everyone is on board, as many governments have outlawed dealing and trading in these digital tokens. While there are apparently over 5,000 known cryptocurrencies in the world today, analysts and experts are still anticipating a rapid rise in the value of Bitcoin, the world’s oldest and most valuable cryptocurrency, with only a few months left in 2021. However, while some nations, like India, are rapidly expanding their crypto markets, others, such as Russia, Morocco, Egypt and Bangladesh, are tightening down. Recently, China’s central bank has announced that all transactions of cryptocurrencies are illegal in the country.

Money laundering via crypto

While they may not be a competitor to the currency in terms of laundering volume at present, the ever-increasing use of cryptocurrency and their unregulated or less-regulated nature in many jurisdictions mean that the financial world has a lot to worry about. The same is echoed in the 2019 meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in Japan. “While crypto-assets do not pose a threat to global financial stability at this point, we remain vigilant to risks, including those related to consumer and investor protection, anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism,” says a note from the meeting.

Crypto advisors often claim that laundering money with cryptocurrencies is highly complex and risky, making it an ineffective strategy compared to conventional techniques. They also argue that transactions in digital currencies are more transparent and accountable compared to fiat currencies. Another argument is: money laundering using cryptocurrencies is comparatively very small in terms of volume and mainstream media is focusing more on criminal activities related to digital currencies rather than technology and innovation. Albeit on a small scale, there is no doubt that cryptocurrencies are being used to facilitate money laundering.

Cryptocurrencies are slowly changing their stature as a mainstream medium of value exchange in the digital era. Many large companies now accept the digital currency for payments of products and services, and many banks consider the adoption of blockchain technology. This being said, cryptocurrency really has the potential to replace their paper and plastic variants. Therefore, it is important to analyse the loopholes enabling these currencies to be used for money laundering and to develop adequate counter technologies to combat the crime.

Some Noteworthy Numbers and Cases

According to the United Nations, between US$800 billion and US$2 trillion are being laundered every year across the globe, representing 2-5% of the global gross domestic product. Out of this, more than 90% goes undetected. The exact volume of crypto laundering is yet to be established. However, we found some indicative statistics on the Internet.

  • A report says that crypto thefts, hacks, and frauds totaled US$1.36 billion in the first five months of 2020, compared to 2019’s US$4.5 billion.
  • According to another report, criminals laundered US$2.8 billion in 2019 using crypto exchanges, compared to US$1 billion in 2018.
  • As of 2019, total bitcoin spending on the dark web was US$829 million, representing 0.5% of all bitcoin transactions.
  • A separate study, analysing more than 800 market maker exchanges, found that 56% of all crypto exchanges worldwide have weak KYC identification protocols — with exchanges in Europe, the US and the UK among the worst offenders.
  • The study noted that 60% of European Virtual Asset Service Providers have deficient KYC practices.

In October 2020, Europol announced that an unprecedented international law enforcement operation involving 16 countries had resulted in the arrest of 20 individuals who attempted to launder tens of millions of euros since 2016 on behalf of the world’s foremost cybercriminals. Operated by the notorious QQAAZZ network, the scheme involved the conversion of stolen funds into cryptocurrency using tumbling services that help hide the source of funds. In yet another incident, a man from New Zealand was arrested on money laundering, worth thousands of dollars, involving cryptocurrency.

How Do Criminals Use Cryptocurrencies for Money Laundering?

To conceal the illegitimate origin of payments, criminals use a variety of strategies involving cryptocurrency. All of these approaches rely on one or more of cryptocurrency’s flaws, such as their intrinsic pseudonymity, ease of cross-border transactions, and decentralised peer-to-peer payments. Money laundering with cryptos follows the same three-stage process as cash-based money laundering.

1. Placement

In this stage, illicit funds are brought into the financial system through intermediaries such as financial institutions, exchanges, shops and casinos. One type of cryptocurrency can be bought with cash or other cryptocurrencies. It can be done through online cryptocurrency exchanges. Criminals often use exchanges with less levels of compliance with AML regulations for this purpose.

2. Layering

In this phase, criminals obscure the illegal source of funds through structured transactions. This makes the trail of illegal funds difficult to decode. Using crypto exchanges, criminals can convert one cryptocurrency into another or can take part in an Initial Coin Offering where payment for one type of digital currency is done with another type. Criminals can also move their crypto holdings to another country.

3. Integration

Here, illegal money is put back into the economy with a clean status. One of the most common techniques of criminals is the use of over the counter (OTC) brokers who act as intermediaries between buyers and sellers of cryptocurrencies. Many OTC brokers specialise in providing money-laundering services and they get very high commission rates for this.

Crypto Mixing

Mixing services, also known as tumblers, help cryptocurrency users to conduct transactions by mixing their cryptos with other users. A typical mixing service takes cryptos from a client, sends them through a series of various addresses and then recombines them, resulting in ‘clean’ cryptos.

Peer-to-peer Crypto networks

Criminals use these decentralised networks to transmit funds to a different location, frequently in another country where there are crypto exchanges with lax anti-money laundering legislation. These exchanges assist individuals in converting cryptocurrency into fiat currency in order to purchase high-end items.

Crypto ATMs

These ATMs allow people to purchase bitcoin via credit or debit cards and in some cases by depositing cash. Some ATMs offer the facility to trade cryptocurrencies for cash as well. In many countries, the KYC measures for the use of these machines are poorly enforced.

Online Gambling

Many gambling sites accept payments in cryptocurrencies. Criminals can purchase chips with cryptos and cash them out after a few transactions.

AML Regulations Related to Cryptocurrency

To combat the use of cryptocurrency in money laundering, regulators around the world have issued laws and advice for businesses trading in digital currencies.

While some regulators have included crypto exchanges and wallet businesses in their existing anti-money laundering legislation, others have established new ones.

  • In June 2019, global AML watchdog the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) published its guidance for virtual assets and virtual asset service providers (VASP). “The FATF strengthened its standards to clarify the application of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing requirements on virtual assets and virtual asset service providers. According to the FATF, countries must now examine and minimise the risks associated with virtual asset financial operations and providers, as well as licence or register providers and subject them to supervision or monitoring by competent national authorities.
  • The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)’s Payment Services Act mandated that crypto businesses operating in the country should obtain a license to comply with AML regulations. In July 2020, the MAS proposed another set of regulations to control the cryptocurrency industry in the country. The European Union (EU) has recently adopted the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD5) which require crypto exchanges and custodial service providers to register with their local regulator and be compliant with know-your-customer (KYC) and anti-money laundering AML procedures. In the US, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) regulates Money Services Businesses (MSBs) under the Bank Secrecy Act.
  • In 2013, FinCEN issued guidance that stated a virtual currency exchange and an administrator of a centralised repository of virtual currency with authority to issue and redeem the currency to be considered as MSBs.
  • Canada became the first country to approve regulation of cryptocurrency in the case of anti-money laundering in 2014, passed by the Parliament of Canada under Bill C-31. The bill aims to amend Canada’s Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act to include Canadian cryptocurrency exchange. It has laid out the framework for regulating entities dealing in digital currencies, treating the currencies as money service businesses (MSBs).

 

How Can Crypto MSBs Ensure AML Compliance?

While regulators can issue guidance and norms, the onus is on MSBs to implement them. They need to have a well-designed AML compliance programme. This should be a well-balanced combination of compliance personal and technology. Having an in-house compliance team may be feasible only for large MSBs. However, the same is usually very expensive and impractical for smaller firms. They would have to rely more on highly intelligent process automation tools and platforms to sift out illegitimate transactions from large data sets.

There should be proper tools to verify the identity of people who transact in cryptocurrencies. They should be able to match and relate blockchain transactions with real identities, creating an end-to-end trail to help with AML investigations. Transaction monitoring tools that dig out suspicious patterns for further investigations are also essential for the AML compliance programmes of crypto MSBs.

The Relevance of Tookitaki Typology Repository in the Crypto World

Tookitaki developed a first-of-its-kind Typology Repository Management (TRM) framework to effectively solve the shortcomings of the present AML transaction monitoring environment. Tookitaki is a provider of proven and in-deployment AML solutions for major and small financial institutions. Through collective intelligence and continual learning, TRM is a novel means of identifying money laundering. Financial institutions will be able to capture shifting customer behaviour and stop bad actors with high accuracy and speed using this advanced machine learning approach, enhancing returns and risk coverage. It detects suspicious cases and prioritises notifications with high accuracy without requiring any personal information.

Tookitaki used the technique to successfully combat money laundering related to cryptocurrencies. We built a TRM-based solution for bitcoin AML compliance as part of the G20TechSprint challenge, a hackathon-style competition jointly organised by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Saudi G20 Presidency. In the category of monitoring and surveillance, the same team came out on top. Our technology could detect money laundering cases employing cryptocurrency via crypto-exchanges or their connection with banks because TRM can be scaled to cover any type of typologies spanning products, places, tactics, and predicate crime for the purpose of locating cryptocurrency-related funds.

To discover our AML solution and its unique features, request a demo here. 

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Blogs
05 Jan 2026
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When Luck Isn’t Luck: Inside the Crown Casino Deception That Fooled the House

1. Introduction to the Scam

In October 2025, a luxury casino overlooking Sydney Harbour became the unlikely stage for one of Australia’s most unusual fraud cases of the year 2025.

There were no phishing links, fake investment platforms, or anonymous scam calls. Instead, the deception unfolded in plain sight across gaming tables, surveillance cameras, and whispered instructions delivered through hidden earpieces.

What initially appeared to be an extraordinary winning streak soon revealed something far more calculated. Over a series of gambling sessions, a visiting couple allegedly accumulated more than A$1.17 million in winnings at Crown Sydney. By late November, the pattern had raised enough concern for casino staff to alert authorities.

The couple were subsequently arrested and charged by New South Wales Police for allegedly dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage by deception.

This was not a random act of cheating.
It was an alleged technology-assisted, coordinated deception, executed with precision, speed, and behavioural discipline.

The case challenges a common assumption in financial crime. Fraud does not always originate online. Sometimes, it operates openly, exploiting trust in physical presence and gaps in behavioural monitoring.

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2. Anatomy of the Scam

Unlike digital payment fraud, this alleged scheme relied on physical execution, real-time coordination, and human decision-making, making it harder to detect in its early stages.

Step 1: Strategic Entry and Short-Term Targeting

The couple arrived in Sydney in October 2025 and began visiting the casino shortly after. Short-stay visitors with no local transaction history often present limited behavioural baselines, particularly in hospitality and gaming environments.

This lack of historical context created an ideal entry point.

Step 2: Use of Covert Recording Devices

Casino staff later identified suspicious equipment allegedly used during gameplay. Police reportedly seized:

  • A small concealed camera attached to clothing
  • A modified mobile phone with recording attachments
  • Custom-built mirrors and magnetised tools

These devices allegedly allowed the capture of live game information not normally accessible to players.

Step 3: Real-Time Remote Coordination

The couple allegedly wore concealed earpieces during play, suggesting live communication with external accomplices. This setup would have enabled:

  • Real-time interpretation of captured visuals
  • Calculation of betting advantages
  • Immediate signalling of wagering decisions

This was not instinct or chance.
It was alleged external intelligence delivered in real time.

Step 4: Repeated High-Value Wins

Across multiple sessions in October and November 2025, the couple reportedly amassed winnings exceeding A$1.17 million. The consistency and scale of success eventually triggered internal alerts within the casino’s surveillance and risk teams.

At this point, the pattern itself became the red flag.

Step 5: Detection and Arrest

Casino staff escalated their concerns to law enforcement. On 27 November 2025, NSW Police arrested the couple, executed search warrants at their accommodation, and seized equipment, cash, and personal items.

The alleged deception ended not because probability failed, but because behaviour stopped making sense.

3. Why This Scam Worked: The Psychology at Play

This case allegedly succeeded because it exploited human assumptions rather than technical weaknesses.

1. The Luck Bias

Casinos are built on probability. Exceptional winning streaks are rare, but not impossible. That uncertainty creates a narrow window where deception can hide behind chance.

2. Trust in Physical Presence

Face-to-face activity feels legitimate. A well-presented individual at a gaming table attracts less suspicion than an anonymous digital transaction.

3. Fragmented Oversight

Unlike banks, where fraud teams monitor end-to-end flows, casinos distribute responsibility across:

  • Dealers
  • Floor supervisors
  • Surveillance teams
  • Risk and compliance units

This fragmentation can delay pattern recognition.

4. Short-Duration Execution

The alleged activity unfolded over weeks, not years. Short-lived, high-impact schemes often evade traditional threshold-based monitoring.

4. The Financial Crime Lens Behind the Case

While this incident occurred in a gambling environment, the mechanics closely mirror broader financial crime typologies.

1. Information Asymmetry Exploitation

Covert devices allegedly created an unfair informational advantage, similar to insider abuse or privileged data misuse in financial markets.

2. Real-Time Decision Exploitation

Live coordination and immediate action resemble:

  • Authorised push payment fraud
  • Account takeover orchestration
  • Social engineering campaigns

Speed neutralised conventional controls.

3. Rapid Value Accumulation

Large gains over a compressed timeframe are classic precursors to:

  • Asset conversion
  • Laundering attempts
  • Cross-border fund movement

Had the activity continued, the next phase could have involved integration into the broader financial system.

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5. Red Flags for Casinos, Banks, and Regulators

This case highlights behavioural signals that extend well beyond gaming floors.

A. Behavioural Red Flags

  • Highly consistent success rates across sessions
  • Near-perfect timing of decisions
  • Limited variance in betting behaviour

B. Operational Red Flags

  • Concealed devices or unusual attire
  • Repeated table changes followed by immediate wins
  • Non-verbal coordination during gameplay

C. Financial Red Flags

  • Sudden accumulation of high-value winnings
  • Requests for rapid payout or conversion
  • Intent to move value across borders shortly after gains

These indicators closely resemble red flags seen in mule networks and high-velocity fraud schemes.

6. How Tookitaki Strengthens Defences

This case reinforces why fraud prevention must move beyond channel-specific controls.

1. Scenario-Driven Intelligence from the AFC Ecosystem

Expert-contributed scenarios help institutions recognise patterns that fall outside traditional fraud categories, including:

  • Behavioural precision
  • Coordinated multi-actor execution
  • Short-duration, high-impact schemes

2. Behavioural Pattern Recognition

Tookitaki’s intelligence approach prioritises:

  • Probability-defying outcomes
  • Decision timing anomalies
  • Consistency where randomness should exist

These signals often surface risk before losses escalate.

3. Cross-Domain Fraud Thinking

The same intelligence principles used to detect:

  • Account takeovers
  • Payment scams
  • Mule networks

are equally applicable to non-traditional environments where value moves quickly.

Fraud is no longer confined to banks. Detection should not be either.

7. Conclusion

The Crown Sydney deception case is a reminder that modern fraud does not always arrive through screens, links, or malware.

Sometimes, it walks confidently through the front door.

This alleged scheme relied on behavioural discipline, real-time coordination, and technological advantage, all hidden behind the illusion of chance.

As fraud techniques continue to evolve, institutions must look beyond static rules and siloed monitoring. The future of fraud prevention lies in understanding behaviour, recognising improbable patterns, and sharing intelligence across ecosystems.

Because when luck stops looking like luck, the signal is already there.

When Luck Isn’t Luck: Inside the Crown Casino Deception That Fooled the House
Blogs
05 Jan 2026
6 min
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Singapore’s Financial Shield: Choosing the Right AML Compliance Software Solutions

When trust is currency, AML compliance becomes your strongest asset.

In Singapore’s fast-evolving financial ecosystem, the battle against money laundering is intensifying. With MAS ramping up expectations and international regulators scrutinising cross-border flows, financial institutions must act decisively. Manual processes and outdated tools are no longer enough. What’s needed is a modern, intelligent, and adaptable approach—enter AML compliance software solutions.

This blog takes a close look at what makes a strong AML compliance software solution, the features to prioritise, and how Singapore’s institutions can future-proof their compliance programmes.

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Why AML Compliance Software Solutions Matter in Singapore

Singapore is a major financial hub, but that status also makes it a high-risk jurisdiction for complex money laundering techniques. From trade-based laundering and shell companies to cyber-enabled fraud, financial crime threats are becoming more global, fast-moving, and tech-driven.

According to the latest MAS Money Laundering Risk Assessment, sectors like banking and cross-border payments are under increasing pressure. Institutions need:

  • Real-time visibility into suspicious behaviour
  • Lower false positives
  • Faster reporting turnaround
  • Cost-effective compliance

The right AML software offers all of this—when chosen well.

What is AML Compliance Software?

AML compliance software refers to digital platforms designed to help financial institutions detect, investigate, report, and prevent financial crime in line with regulatory requirements. These systems combine rule-based logic, machine learning, and scenario-based monitoring to provide end-to-end compliance coverage.

Key use cases include:

Core Features to Look for in AML Compliance Software Solutions

Not all AML platforms are created equal. Here are the top features your solution must have:

1. Real-Time Transaction Monitoring

The ability to flag suspicious activities as they happen—especially critical in high-risk verticals such as remittance, retail banking, and digital assets.

2. Risk-Based Approach

Modern systems allow for dynamic risk scoring based on customer behaviour, transaction patterns, and geographical exposure. This enables prioritised investigations.

3. AI and Machine Learning Models

Look for adaptive learning capabilities that improve accuracy over time, helping to reduce false positives and uncover previously unseen threats.

4. Integrated Screening Engine

Your system should seamlessly screen customers and transactions against global sanctions lists, PEPs, and adverse media sources.

5. End-to-End Case Management

From alert generation to case disposition and reporting, the platform should provide a unified workflow that helps analysts move faster.

6. Regulatory Alignment

Built-in compliance with local MAS guidelines (such as PSN02, AML Notices, and STR filing requirements) is essential for institutions in Singapore.

7. Explainability and Auditability

Tools that provide clear reasoning behind alerts and decisions can ensure internal transparency and regulatory acceptance.

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Common Challenges in AML Compliance

Singaporean financial institutions often face the following hurdles:

  • High false positive rates
  • Fragmented data systems across business lines
  • Manual case reviews slowing down investigations
  • Delayed or inaccurate regulatory reports
  • Difficulty adjusting to new typologies or scams

These challenges aren’t just operational—they can lead to regulatory penalties, reputational damage, and lost customer trust. AML software solutions address these pain points by introducing automation, intelligence, and scalability.

How Tookitaki’s FinCense Delivers End-to-End AML Compliance

Tookitaki’s FinCense platform is purpose-built to solve compliance pain points faced by financial institutions across Singapore and the broader APAC region.

Key Benefits:

  • Out-of-the-box scenarios from the AFC Ecosystem that adapt to new risk patterns
  • Federated learning to improve model accuracy across institutions without compromising data privacy
  • Smart Disposition Engine for automated case narration, regulatory reporting, and audit readiness
  • Real-time monitoring with adaptive risk scoring and alert prioritisation

With FinCense, institutions have reported:

  • 72% reduction in false positives
  • 3.5x increase in analyst efficiency
  • Greater regulator confidence due to better audit trails

FinCense isn’t just software—it’s a trust layer for modern financial crime prevention.

Best Practices for Evaluating AML Compliance Software

Before investing, financial institutions should ask:

  1. Does the software scale with your future growth and risk exposure?
  2. Can it localise to Singapore’s regulatory and typology landscape?
  3. Is the AI explainable, and is the platform auditable?
  4. Can it ingest external intelligence and industry scenarios?
  5. How quickly can you update detection rules based on new threats?

Singapore’s Regulatory Expectations

The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has emphasised risk-based, tech-enabled compliance in its guidance. Recent thematic reviews and enforcement actions have highlighted the importance of:

  • Timely Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STRs)
  • Strong detection of mule accounts and digital fraud patterns
  • Collaboration with industry peers to address cross-institution threats

AML software is no longer just about ticking boxes—it must show effectiveness, agility, and accountability.

Conclusion: Future-Ready Compliance Begins with the Right Tools

Singapore’s compliance landscape is becoming more complex, more real-time, and more collaborative. The right AML software helps financial institutions stay one step ahead—not just of regulators, but of financial criminals.

From screening to reporting, from risk scoring to AI-powered decisioning, AML compliance software solutions are no longer optional. They are mission-critical.

Choose wisely, and you don’t just meet compliance—you build competitive trust.

Singapore’s Financial Shield: Choosing the Right AML Compliance Software Solutions
Blogs
23 Dec 2025
6 min
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AML Failures Are Now Capital Risks: The Bendigo Case Proves It

When Australian regulators translate AML failures into capital penalties, it signals more than enforcement. It signals a fundamental shift in how financial crime risk is priced, governed, and punished.

The recent action against Bendigo and Adelaide Bank marks a decisive turning point in Australia’s regulatory posture. Weak anti-money laundering controls are no longer viewed as back-office compliance shortcomings. They are now being treated as prudential risks with direct balance-sheet consequences.

This is not just another enforcement headline. It is a clear warning to the entire financial sector.

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What happened at Bendigo Bank

Following an independent review, regulators identified significant and persistent deficiencies in Bendigo Bank’s financial crime control framework. What stood out was not only the severity of the gaps, but their duration.

Key weaknesses remained unresolved for more than six years, spanning from 2019 to 2025. These were not confined to a single branch, product, or customer segment. They were assessed as systemic, affecting governance, oversight, and the effectiveness of AML controls across the institution.

In response, regulators acted in coordination:

The framing matters. This was not positioned as punishment for an isolated incident. Regulators explicitly pointed to long-standing control failures and prolonged exposure to financial crime risk.

Why this is not just another AML penalty

This case stands apart from past enforcement actions for one critical reason.

Capital was used as the lever.

A capital add-on is fundamentally different from a fine or enforceable undertaking. By requiring additional capital to be held, APRA is signalling that deficiencies in financial crime controls materially increase an institution’s operational risk profile.

Until those risks are demonstrably addressed, they must be absorbed on the balance sheet.

The consequences are tangible:

  • Reduced capital flexibility
  • Pressure on return on equity
  • Constraints on growth and strategic initiatives
  • Prolonged supervisory scrutiny

The underlying message is unambiguous.
AML weaknesses now come with a measurable capital cost.

AML failures are now viewed as prudential risk

This case also signals a shift in how regulators define the problem.

The findings were not limited to missed alerts or procedural non-compliance. Regulators highlighted broader, structural weaknesses, including:

  • Ineffective transaction monitoring
  • Inadequate customer risk assessment and limited beneficial ownership visibility
  • Weak escalation from branch-level operations
  • Fragmented oversight between frontline teams and central compliance
  • Governance gaps that allowed weaknesses to persist undetected

These are not execution errors.
They are risk management failures.

This explains the joint involvement of APRA and AUSTRAC. Financial crime controls are now firmly embedded within expectations around enterprise risk management, institutional resilience, and safety and soundness.

Six years of exposure is a governance failure

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Bendigo case is duration.

When material AML weaknesses persist across multiple years, audit cycles, and regulatory engagements, the issue is no longer technology alone. It becomes a question of:

  • Risk culture
  • Accountability
  • Board oversight
  • Management prioritisation

Australian regulators have made it increasingly clear that financial crime risk cannot be fully delegated to second-line functions. Boards and senior executives are expected to understand AML risk in operational and strategic terms, not just policy language.

This reflects a broader global trend. Prolonged AML failures are now widely treated as indicators of governance weakness, not just compliance gaps.

Why joint APRA–AUSTRAC action matters

The coordinated response itself is a signal.

APRA’s mandate centres on institutional stability and resilience. AUSTRAC’s mandate focuses on financial intelligence and the disruption of serious and organised crime. When both regulators act together, it reflects a shared conclusion: financial crime control failures have crossed into systemic risk territory.

This convergence is becoming increasingly common internationally. Regulators are no longer willing to separate AML compliance from prudential supervision when weaknesses are persistent, enterprise-wide, and inadequately addressed.

For Australian institutions, this means AML maturity is now inseparable from broader risk and capital considerations.

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The hidden cost of delayed remediation

The Bendigo case also exposes an uncomfortable truth.

Delayed remediation is expensive.

When control weaknesses are allowed to persist, institutions often face:

  • Large-scale, multi-year transformation programs
  • Significant technology modernisation costs
  • Extensive retraining and cultural change initiatives
  • Capital locked up until regulators are satisfied
  • Sustained supervisory and reputational pressure

What could have been incremental improvements years earlier can escalate into a full institutional overhaul when left unresolved.

In this context, capital add-ons act not just as penalties, but as forcing mechanisms to ensure sustained executive and board-level focus.

What this means for Australian banks and fintechs

This case should prompt serious reflection across the sector.

Several lessons are already clear:

  • Static, rules-based monitoring struggles to keep pace with evolving typologies
  • Siloed fraud and AML functions miss cross-channel risk patterns
  • Documented controls are insufficient if they are not effective in practice
  • Regulators are increasingly focused on outcomes, not frameworks

Importantly, this applies beyond major banks. Regional institutions, mutuals, and digitally expanding fintechs are firmly within scope. Scale is no longer a mitigating factor.

Where technology must step in before capital is at risk

Cases like Bendigo expose a widening gap between regulatory expectations and how financial crime controls are still implemented in many institutions. Legacy systems, fragmented monitoring, and periodic reviews are increasingly misaligned with the realities of modern financial crime.

At Tookitaki, financial crime prevention is approached as a continuous intelligence challenge, rather than a static compliance obligation. The emphasis is on adaptability, explainability, and real-time risk visibility, enabling institutions to surface emerging threats before they escalate into supervisory or capital issues.

By combining real-time transaction monitoring with collaborative, scenario-driven intelligence, institutions can reduce blind spots and demonstrate sustained control effectiveness. In an environment where regulators are increasingly focused on whether controls actually work, this ability is becoming central to maintaining regulatory confidence.

Many of the weaknesses highlighted in this case mirror patterns seen across recent regulatory reviews. Institutions that address them early are far better positioned to avoid capital shocks later.

From compliance posture to risk ownership

The clearest takeaway from the Bendigo case is the need for a mindset shift.

Financial crime risk can no longer be treated as a downstream compliance concern. It must be owned as a core institutional risk, alongside credit, liquidity, and operational resilience.

Institutions that proactively modernise their AML capabilities and strengthen governance will be better placed to avoid prolonged remediation, capital constraints, and reputational damage.

A turning point for trust and resilience

The action against Bendigo Bank is not about one institution. It reflects a broader regulatory recalibration.

AML failures are now capital risks.

In Australia’s evolving regulatory landscape, AML is no longer a cost of doing business.
It is a measure of institutional resilience, governance strength, and trustworthiness.

Those that adapt early will navigate this shift with confidence. Those that do not may find that the cost of getting AML wrong is far higher than expected.

AML Failures Are Now Capital Risks: The Bendigo Case Proves It